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PROPERTY LAW FOR THE AGES

MICHAEL C. POLLACK* & LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ**
ABSTRACT
Within the next forty years, the number of Americans over age
sixty-five is projected to nearly double. This seismic demographic
shift will necessitate a reckoning in several areas of law and policy,
but property law is especially unprepared. Built primarily for young
and middle-aged white men, the common law of property has been
critiqued for decades for the ways in which it oppresses or simply
leaves behind people based on their race, sex, Native heritage, and
more. This Article contributes a new focus on property law’s treatment of people based on their advanced age. Burdened by higher
relocation costs, more inelastic incomes, and shorter time horizons
than those faced by younger people, elderly people encounter a doctrine that often fails to protect their interests.
This Article explores five areas of property law and evaluates how
each fits—or, more frequently, fails to fit—the characteristics of
many older subjects. From the law of takings to the law of waste, and
from tenant protections to homeowners’ associations, not only is the
law a poor fit, but the consequences for the health, safety, finances,
and well-being of elderly people are often dramatic. At the same time,
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one of the rare significant efforts made thus far to protect older
people from some of these consequences—the Fair Housing Act’s
protection for age-restricted communities—has generated new inequities of its own that raise important questions about competing
civil rights priorities. Accordingly, mindful of the dangers of overcorrection, this Article offers institutional reforms aimed to better
protect the interests of older people in each area without unduly infringing upon those of others.
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INTRODUCTION
The judges who developed the common law of property had a clear
vision of their customers. Anglo-American property doctrine was
built by and for the benefit of young and middle-aged white men—
people who the judges romantically envisioned taming the natural
landscape, colonizing territory, tilling the soil, building dwellings,
establishing mills, excavating mines, and seamlessly transferring
land to each other.1 Over the past century, some scholars, legislators, and judges have advanced a more inclusive conception of
property that embraces the idea of Black Americans and Native
Americans as owners, rather than one that subordinates them and
treats them as property or mere occupants.2 An equally important
project in property law has sought to put women on equal footing
with men after centuries of second-class status.3 Contemporary
Americans continue to work to build a robust property doctrine that
serves the needs and respects the humanity of people, regardless of
race and sex.
In this Article we ask whether there is room in property doctrine
to be attuned to differences related to advanced age, as age operates
alongside and intersects with these other salient distinctions.4 In
1. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1724-25 (1993).
2. See id.; see, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential
Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437 (2006); Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black Landownership, Political Independence, and Community
through Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 505 (2001); Joseph
William Singer, Property and Coercion in Federal Indian Law: The Conflict Between Critical
and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1821 (1990).
3. See, e.g., Gretchen Arnold & Megan Slusser, Silencing Women’s Voices: Nuisance
Property Laws and Battered Women, 40 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 908 (2015); Noah M. Kazis, Fair
Housing for a Non-Sexist City, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1683 (2021); Carol M. Rose, Women and
Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421 (1992); Reva B. Siegel, Home as
Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103
YALE L.J. 1073 (1994).
4. In this respect, we join company with a rich theoretical scholarship about elder rights
and responsibilities, and age discrimination. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM & SAUL
LEVMORE, AGING THOUGHTFULLY: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RETIREMENT, ROMANCE, WRINKLES,
AND REGRET 181-95 (2017); Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Age Diversity, 94 S. CAL. L. REV. 303
(2021) [hereinafter Boni-Saenz, Diversity]; Nina A. Kohn, A Framework for Theoretical Inquiry into Law and Aging, 21 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 187, 204 (2020); Alexander A. BoniSaenz, Age, Equality, and Vulnerability, 21 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 161 (2020) [hereinafter
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the United States, this question takes on a heightened urgency, for
within the next forty years the percentage of Americans over age
sixty-five is projected to reach 29 percent, growing from 19 percent
today and 13 percent a decade ago.5 Countries all over the world,
both rich and poor, are coping with aging populations and declining
birth rates too.6 But, as we shall explain below, many property doctrines are built around the needs of younger people in the prime of
their lives. As a result, key aspects of the law do not reflect the
needs of the older people who comprise increasingly large segments
of the populace in the United States and other developed countries.
In this Article, we will focus on ways in which takings law, the law
of waste and life tenancies, landlord-tenant law, and the law of
common interest communities fail to vindicate interests that are
especially important to the flourishing of older Americans. We will
suggest several attractive reforms in each arena that would make
the law more responsive to the interests of an aging society.7 At the
same time, we will draw attention to one area of property law—the
Fair Housing Act’s exemptions for age-restricted communities—that
arguably goes too far in vindicating the interests of an elderly
population. In the process, we point to the heretofore unrecognized
role of age segregation in promoting racial segregation, and we identify the difficult tradeoffs policymakers must face.
In our analysis there are at least three basic features that, taken
together, tend to differentiate older people from younger people. To
Boni-Saenz, Vulnerability]; Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Age, Time, and Discrimination, 53 GA.
L. REV. 845 (2019) [hereinafter Boni-Saenz, Discrimination]; Martha Albertson Fineman,
“Elderly” as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of Individual and Societal Responsibility, 20
ELDER L.J. 71, 74-76 (2012).
5. Patrick Button, Population Aging, Age Discrimination, and Age Discrimination Protections at the 50th Anniversary of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 2 (IZA Inst. Lab.
Econ., Discussion Paper No. 12265, 2019).
6. See Damien Cave, Emma Bubola & Choe Sang-Hun, Long Slide Looms for World
Population, with Sweeping Ramifications, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/05/22/world/global-population-shrinking.html [https://perma.cc/E7QV-XKBX].
7. In that sense, this project is congenial to the recent explosion in legal scholarship on
the concept of personalized law. See generally ALGORITHMIC REGULATION AND PERSONALIZED
LAW: A HANDBOOK (Christoph Busch & Alberto De Franceschi eds., 2021); Omri Ben-Shahar,
Personalized Elder Law, 28 ELDER L.J. 281 (2020); Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 627 (2016); Anthony J. Casey & Anthony
Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401 (2017); Cass R. Sunstein,
Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2013); Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417 (2014).
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the extent that property law’s generally impersonal, one-size-fitsall approach systematically fails to promote human flourishing, the
shortcomings typically can be tied to one or more of these core
attributes. First, elderly people tend to face higher relocation costs,
in large measure because of their greater reliance on community
support resources. Second, older people have relatively inelastic
incomes. That is, they are less able to substantially increase their
earnings if their financial needs grow, thanks to retirement, disability, and pervasive age discrimination in employment markets.
Third, elderly people will tend to have shorter time horizons than
their younger counterparts. Or, put in economic terms, they generally have higher discount rates, focusing more on the short- and
medium-term than the longer-term.
While “aging is a highly individualized process,” which no doubt
makes the elderly population heterogeneous,8 and while some of the
common stereotypes about elderly people turn out to be largely
untrue, there is conclusive enough evidence for each of these propositions to warrant taking these features into account as we
explore how well property law meets the needs of older people in
general. We elaborate on the evidence for each of these characterizations below.
Before doing so, though, it is important to underscore two points.
The first is that age is an imperfect proxy for these attributes. But
while there are certainly some younger people who face high relocation costs and some older people who do not, or some younger
people with income constraints and some older people with fairly
elastic incomes, tailoring property law to each of these attributes
and assessing people individually would impose extraordinary
burdens on law and on actors in the legal system.9 Moreover, one
can fake short time horizons or attachment to a particular location,
but falsifying one’s age is a far harder task.
The second is that older people are, like all groups of people,
heterogeneous. But subdividing senior citizens into several groups
8. Boni-Saenz, Vulnerability, supra note 4, at 168. That said, as Boni-Saenz recognizes,
“[a]ge is certainly correlated with declines in certain types of physical and mental functioning”
and “the proxy becomes stronger when examining the population of the old-old, or those over
the age of 85, who more generally experience the types of functional declines that are stereotypically associated with age.” Id.
9. See id. at 167-68.
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that have differing rights could start our politics down a slippery
slope towards a presently unmanageable number of demands for
further legal customization. Turning instead to a category that is
easy to identify, that is already stable in American law, and that
captures with reasonable reliability the attributes we think are important—a category defined generally as starting at the age of sixtyfive—is therefore likely to be the most efficient and defensible way
to properly account for those attributes in law and policy.10
The stability of this category is worth further emphasizing.
Various states already have special legal protections for senior
citizens that have not been extended to other demographic groups
despite the passage of considerable time. For example, Illinois
lengthens the mandatory cooling off period for home repair and
remodeling contracts from three days to fifteen days for senior
citizens.11 Numerous states provide property tax exemptions to
senior citizens.12 The federal Medicare program has protected the
sixty-five and over group for decades without expansion to other
age groups or vulnerable populations,13 and sixty-five and over
proved to be a salient and relatively uncontroversial criterion in
COVID-19 vaccine allocation.14 Treating senior citizens as a single
group that receives extra protections has not sent society careening
down a slippery slope towards carve-outs for everyone.
For skeptics of personalized law, this history should be comforting. This concern both explains why we think lines can be drawn
between sixty-four and sixty-five-year-olds, and also explains why
we do not propose treating older senior citizens differently than
10. To take just a few examples, the Census uses the age of sixty-five to denote the category of older Americans. See Older Population and Aging, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.
census.gov/topics/population/older-aging.html [https://perma.cc/KUC7-6YWK]. Medicare eligibility begins, with some exceptions, at the age of sixty-five. See Medicare Benefits, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/benefits/medicare/ [https://perma.cc/R3QJ-PKBG]. Full Social
Security retirement benefits start between the ages of sixty-six and sixty-seven, depending
on one’s birth year. See Retirement Benefits, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/benefits/
retirement/planner/agereduction.html [https://perma.cc/ME6H-JXWV].
11. Ben-Shahar, supra note 7, at 291-92.
12. See Robert C. Christopherson, Note, Missing the Forest for the Trees: The Illusory
Half-Policy of Senior Citizen Property Tax Relief, 13 ELDER L.J. 195, 197-98 (2005).
13. See Medicare Benefits, supra note 10.
14. See Stephanie Soucheray, US COVID-19 Vaccine Strategy Pivots to Target Those 65
and up, CIDRAP (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2021/01/uscovid-19-vaccine-strategy-pivots-target-those-65-and [https://perma.cc/8F8S-FE4P].
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younger senior citizens. Tailoring is a virtue, but providing different rights to different tranches of the elderly population would
entail legal and administrative complexity that does not seem costjustified.15
Turning now to the three core attributes we identify as distinguishing older people from younger people, the first and most
important for property law is that elderly people generally face
higher transaction costs with respect to relocation than younger
people. In other words, while property law assumes that exit—
escaping poor conditions, meeting new needs, and the like—is
relatively smooth, opportunities for exit and ease of relocation are
in fact substantially constrained for older people relative to younger
people. This thread runs through each facet of property law we
discuss in this Article, with meaningful consequences for each.
Consider at the outset that Americans over age sixty-five are
simply significantly less likely to move than their younger counterparts.16 According to census data, 12 percent of Americans age
fifty-four and under moved residences between 2018 and 2019.17
But only 4.4 percent of Americans over age fifty-five did the same.18
The same pattern appears each year going back to at least 2015:
younger Americans are about three times more likely to move in a
given year than elderly Americans.19 Moreover, while there are
15. See Boni-Saenz, Vulnerability, supra note 4, at 167-68.
16. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARVARD UNIV., PROJECTIONS & IMPLICATIONS
FOR HOUSING A GROWING POPULATION: OLDER HOUSEHOLDS 2015-2035 25 (2016), https://
www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/harvard_jchs_housing_growing_population_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GD7K-G9RP] [hereinafter JCHS REPORT]. Americans over age sixty-five are
also more likely to own their homes, and to do so free of any mortgage obligation, than the
national average. See HOUS. ASSISTANCE COUNCIL, HOUSING AN AGING RURAL AMERICA: RURAL
SENIORS AND THEIR HOMES 21 (2014), https://ruralhome.org/wp-content/uploads/storage/docu
ments/publications/rrreports/ruralseniors2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD9A-NU27].
17. Geographic Mobility: 2018 to 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, tbl.1, https://www.census.
gov/data/tables/2019/demo/geographic-mobility/cps-2019.html [https://perma.cc/ALH4-BD6D]
[hereinafter HAC REPORT],.
18. Id.
19. From 2014 to 2015, 14.2 percent of younger Americans moved compared to about 4.97
percent of elderly Americans. Geographic Mobility: 2014 to 2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU tbl.1,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2015/demo/geographic-mobility/cps-2015.html
[https://perma.cc/AZH2-F95Y]. From 2015 to 2016, 14 percent of younger Americans moved
in comparison to 4.2 percent of elderly Americans. Geographic Mobility: 2015 to 2016, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, at tbl.1, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/geographic-mobility/
cps-2016.html [https://perma.cc/AZJ3-MK98]. From 2016 to 2017, 13.6 percent versus 4.6
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small fluctuations over time in the rate at which younger Americans
move, the rate of mobility among older Americans tends to be fairly
constant. There are, of course, numerous possible explanations for
this disparity: perhaps older people want to avoid being taxed on the
sale of an appreciated home, perhaps they benefit from rent control
or other regimes that privilege longevity,20 perhaps they are less
likely to rent and renters are simply more mobile than owners
across ages, and so on. But despite these confounding factors, there
is data from Spain suggesting both that older homeowners are
indeed significantly less willing to sell their homes than younger
homeowners and that people under the age of seventy are two to
three times more likely to be willing to sell their homes than people
over the age of seventy.21
We make no strong causal claims based on this data alone. But
whatever the mechanism, the data nonetheless suggest that (1)
older people are less inclined to relocate, and (2) their level of
interest in doing so is fairly stable and not especially responsive to
macroeconomic or other such factors.22 This interpretation is
bolstered by survey data suggesting that when the oldest Americans—those over age seventy-five—do move, it is primarily because

percent. Geographic Mobility: 2016 to 2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU tbl.1, https://www.census.
gov/data/tables/2015/demo/geographic-mobility/cps-2017.html [https://perma.cc/HY5Y-ZEUA].
From 2017 to 2018, 12.5 percent versus 4.2 percent. Geographic Mobility: 2017 to 2018, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU tbl.1, https://www.census.gov/ data/tables/2018/demo/geographicmobility/cps-2018.html [https://perma.cc/AX5C-CC68].
20. In California, Proposition 13 encourages longtime homeowners to remain in their
homes longer than they otherwise would. See Evelyn Danforth, Note, Proposition 13,
Revisited, 73 STAN. L. REV. 511, 521-27 (2021). Selling the home would cause a new owner to
pay higher property taxes than the previous owner did. Id. Many other states enacted similar property tax provisions that cap increases below the rate of inflation. See id. at 521.
21. Joan Costa-Font, Joan Gil & Oscar Mascarilla, Housing Wealth Decisions in Old Age:
Sale and Reversion, 25 HOUS. STUD. 375, 385 & fig.2 (2010).
22. Case studies concur. See, e.g., Russell N. James III, Residential Satisfaction of Elderly
Tenants in Apartment Housing, 89 SOC. INDICATORS RSCH. 421, 423 (2008) (collecting literature supporting claim that “elderly residents are ... less likely to consider moving”);
Carolyn Norris-Baker & Rick J. Scheidt, From ‘Our Town’ to ‘Ghost Town’?: The Changing
Context of Home for Rural Elders, 38 INT’L J. AGING & HUM. DEV. 181, 191-93 (1994)
(presenting findings from a case study of small towns in Kansas and attributing reluctance
to relocate on the part of elderly people, even amidst economic distress, to “intensity of
attachment to home and community strengthened by length of residence, the high value
placed on personal competence and independence, and lack of housing alternatives,” all of
which are discussed later in this piece).
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changing health needs compel them to do so.23 Indeed, a noteworthy
recent survey revealed that 83 percent of senior citizens wanted to
stay in their current homes for as long as possible, and the vast
majority strongly preferred to age in place.24
But it is mostly by looking beyond the broad data that we can
begin to flesh out some of the reasons why mobility and exit opportunities for older people might be relatively limited and more rarely
exercised. For one, the particular amenities and fixtures in one’s
home become less fungible as one ages. Many people over the age of
fifty have made choices about their home so that it will be a
residence in which they can safely age in place.25
For example, not all homes have a driveway or parking space immediately outside the home, but according to one survey, 94 percent
of respondents over the age of fifty have a home with that particular
mobility-enhancing amenity.26 Eighty-five percent have a full
bathroom on the main level of their house, and 81 percent have a
bedroom on the main level.27 Both of these features can be critical
forms of preparation for a future when one cannot safely climb or
descend stairs. To be sure, a driveway or parking space outside one’s
home benefits many younger people too. Our point is that the
existence of that sort of feature is likely to be more salient for an
older person and more closely related to his or her well-being. That
feature, therefore, likely operates as more of a constraint on his or
her residential choices. Indeed, people over fifty who feel that their
homes meet their needs and will continue to do so as they age report
lower levels of isolation, higher levels of optimism, better quality of
life, and greater confidence in their ability to tackle their futures.28
23. AARP, BEYOND 50.05: A REPORT TO THE NATION ON LIVABLE COMMUNITIES: CREATING
ENVIRONMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL AGING 66 fig. 15 (2005), https://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/
il/beyond_50_communities.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EEQ-N5KE] [hereinafter HACREPORT]; see
Gary W. Evans, Elyse Kantrowitz & Paul Eshelman, Housing Quality and Psychological WellBeing Among the Elderly Population, 57B J. GERONTOLOGY P381, P382 (2002) (“[E]lderly
individuals usually move because of changes in work status or health.”). Tiebout sorting also
provides a partial explanation. See Karen Smith Conway & Andrew J. Houtenville, Do the
Elderly “Vote with Their Feet?”, 97 PUB. CHOICE 663, 683 (1998).
24. See Margaret F. Brinig, Grandparents and Accessory Dwelling Units: Preserving Intimacy and Independence, 22 ELDER L.J. 381, 385 (2014).
25. See HAC REPORT, supra note 16, at 26.
26. AARP REPORT, supra note 23, at 53 fig.8.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 54 fig.9.
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The costs of relocation for older people extend beyond the difficulty of locating a similar substitute house with necessary features.
Sociological research and survey data indicate that elderly homeowners are more embedded in and attached to their homes and
neighborhoods and that they are more reliant on those connections
and resources for their physical and mental health and well-being
than younger people.29 Indeed, about half of all senior homeowners
moved into their homes before 1970, so they have had decades to
build up those ties.30 And even among older people, one’s level of
attachment to one’s home and community only increases as one
continues to age.31 A clear supermajority of older Americans insist
that they prefer to “age in place,”32 which reflects the fact that colocation with one’s doctors, house of worship, family members, close
friends, familiar landmarks, and the like are more than just the
subjective attachments that everyone young and old has to their
homes.33 For older people, these can be literal lifelines, the loss of
which threatens not only their satisfaction, but their very lives and
senses of self.34
Our claim is not that younger people face no relocation costs; of
course, they do. But as noted above, younger people’s relocation behavior reveals what at least appears to be a higher tolerance for
those costs.35 And younger people’s relative independence—on
29. See Jeffrey S. Smith & Matthew R. Cartlidge, Place Attachment Among Retirees in
Greensburg, Kansas, 101 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 536, 542 (2011); Melinda M. Swenson, The
Meaning of Home to Five Elderly Women, 19 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT’L 381, 381, 391
(1998); Craig A. Cookman, Older People and Attachment to Things, Places, Pets, and Ideas,
28 J. NURSING SCHOLARSHIP 227, 229 (1996); AARP REPORT, supra note 23, at 25; cf. Margaret
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 967 (1982) (“Much of the property
we unhesitatingly consider personal—for example, family albums, diaries, photographs, heirlooms, and the home—is connected with memory and the continuity of self through memory.”).
30. HAC REPORT, supra note 16, at 22; see also Kevin M. Cremin, Note, The Transition
to Section 8 Housing: Will the Elderly Be Left Behind?, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 405, 418
(2000).
31. See AARP REPORT, supra note 23, at 25 tbl.1 (reporting that 79 percent of respondents
aged fifty to sixty-four, 88 percent of respondents aged sixty-five to seventy-four, and 89 percent of respondents over age seventy-five want to live in the same community five years from
now).
32. Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, A Room of One’s Own? Accessory Dwelling
Unit Reforms and Local Parochialism, 45 URB. LAW 519, 530 (2013).
33. See Smith & Cartlidge, supra note 29, at 542.
34. See Cookman, supra note 29, at 228.
35. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
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average—provides good reasons why they might better tolerate
those costs. After all, community engagement is especially crucial
for elderly people because it provides them with direction, purpose,
meaningful social roles, and a sense of independence, control, and
self-esteem—all things that younger people tend to acquire through
jobs and family responsibilities and all things that are easily lost
after one retires and after one’s children are grown.36 A community
also prevents social isolation, which tends to lead to both mental
and physical declines, and promotes intellectual stimulation and
happiness, both of which can reduce cognitive impairment and increase immune functioning.37 There is even some reason to believe
that the loss of community attachments from relocation corresponds
to worse health outcomes—including an increased risk of both
depression and death from coronary disease—as one ages.38 Selfassessments concur, with higher rates of reported community attachment among older adults who assess themselves to be in good
health,39 and longitudinal studies similarly suggest lower mortality
among those with more social and community connections.40
Finally, what is especially vexing about the heightened relocation
costs faced by elderly people is that many of those costs are generally difficult to minimize through ex ante policy interventions.
That is, many of them flow from personal and emotional connections
such as homes tailored to one’s needs, community attachments, and
interpersonal relationships. There is likely little that government
can do cost-effectively to alleviate the harms that come from losing
those connections. So, while we certainly think interventions that
could minimize these costs would be valuable, we are skeptical that
substantial progress could be made from that angle. Instead, we
36. See Smith & Cartlidge, supra note 29, at 540-43; Swenson, supra note 29, at 381, 391;
Cookman, supra note 29, at 229; AARP REPORT, supra note 23, at 22-23.
37. AARP REPORT, supra note 23, at 23.
38. Id. at 27; Teresa E. Seeman, Health Promoting Effects of Friends and Family on
Health Outcomes in Older Adults, 14 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 362, 364 (2000); see NorrisBaker & Scheidt, supra note 22, at 185-86; see also David J. O’Brien, Edward W. Hassinger
& Larry Dershem, Community Attachment and Depression Among Residents in Two Rural
Midwestern Communities, 59 RURAL SOCIO. 255, 263 (1994) (finding that, even accounting for
economic viability of a given community, feelings of attachment to that community are associated with lower levels of depression).
39. AARP REPORT, supra note 23, at 27 tbl.2; see HAC REPORT, supra note 16, at 11.
40. See Seeman, supra note 38, at 363.
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take the existence of these costs largely as a given and explore how
property law ought to account for them.
The remaining two attributes of elderly people—inelastic income
and shorter time horizons—do not pervade every facet of property
law’s distinct impact on older people, but they each recur in some.
Consider first the fact that a large portion of elderly Americans live
on fixed incomes, often deriving their money from sources that are
not indexed to increases in inflation.41 In 2019, only 28 percent of
adults aged sixty-five to seventy-four were employed full-time; that
rate falls to 9 percent for adults over age seventy-five.42 By contrast,
full-time employment rates for younger adults ranged from a low
of 65 percent for people aged fifty-five to sixty-four to a high of 83
percent for adults aged thirty-five to forty-four.43 Much of this disparity is of course explained by voluntary retirements, but employment discrimination based on age remains a malignant force for
many despite laws formally prohibiting such behavior.44 Either way,
seniors are limited in their ability to increase their earnings.45
41. Benjamin Bridges, Jr. & Michael D. Packard, Price and Income Changes for the
Elderly, SOC. SEC. BULL., Jan. 1981, at 3, 3.
42. Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate by Age, Sex, Race, and Ethnicity, U.S. BUREAU
LAB. STAT. (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/civilian-labor-force-participationrate.htm [https://perma.cc/H6HK-XMGC].
43. Id. To be sure, rates of employment for people over age sixty continue to increase. See
Gary Burtless, The Impact of Population Aging and Delayed Retirement on Workforce
Productivity 4-5 (Ctr. for Ret. Rsch. Bos. Coll., Working Paper No. 2013-11, 2013), https://
crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/wp_2013-111.pdf [https://perma.cc/GPU8-ZEZ2]. Some
elderly individuals also earn income through part-time employment. Thomas Hungerford,
Matthew Rassette, Howard Iams & Melissa Koenig, Trends in Economic Status of the Elderly,
1976-2000, SOC. SEC. BULL., Jan. 2003, at 12, 14. In the aggregate, earned employment income accounts for about one quarter of elderly income. Id. at 20.
44. See Cathy Ventrell-Monsees, It’s Unlawful Age Discrimination—Not the “Natural
Order” of the Workplace!, 40 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 92-93 (2019); Joanna Lahey,
State Age Protection Laws and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 51 J.L. & ECON.
433, 434 (2008); see also Rebecca Perron, The Value of Experience: Age Discrimination Against
Older Workers Persists, AARP 3 (2018), https://doi.org/10.26419/res.00177.002 [https://
perma.cc/NV6T-A685]. The best evidence suggests that age discrimination against older
women is more pronounced than age discrimination against older men, and that workers near
the retirement age of sixty-five face much more age discrimination than workers in their
fifties do. See David Neumark, Ian Burn & Patrick Button, Is It Harder for Older Workers to
Find Jobs? New and Improved Evidence from a Field Experiment, 127 J. POL. ECON. 922, 966
(2019).
45. Lingxiao Zhao & Gregory Burge, Housing Wealth, Property Taxes, and Labor Supply
Among the Elderly, 35 J. LAB. ECON. 227, 259 (2017) (finding that the labor participation rates
of workers seventy-three and older are entirely unresponsive to changes in housing wealth
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Without the salary-based income drawn by younger Americans, the
retired elderly tend to be more reliant on public programs such as
Social Security and on assets like bonds, pensions, and tax-deferred
retirement plans to fund their life needs.46 And even that may not
be enough.47 The median total asset value for nonbankrupt people
over sixty-five is around $250,000.48 While that may sound like a lot
of money, at best it will barely cover their projected medical costs.49
The skyrocketing price of health care and a shrinking social safety
net are causing the finances of older Americans to deteriorate and
are leading an increasing proportion of them to file for bankruptcy.50
This problem is not confined to poorer seniors. Most middle-class
elderly Americans lack the resources they will need to pay for housing and long-term care.51
Whether retired or working, then, those older individuals who do
own their homes or other real property naturally count on the ability to liquidate that property, use it as collateral, rent it, farm it, or
otherwise enjoy its fruits as an important aspect of their financial
freedom. Because the equity in one’s home often makes up the bulk
of one’s net worth,52 and with employment income sources shrunk
or tax rates but do respond to changes in their health status).
46. Hungerford et al., supra note 43, at 18-21. Whereas roughly one-quarter of people over
age sixty-five earn employment income, according to 2008 data, 90 percent derive income from
retirement benefits and 54 percent derive income from assets. Income of the Population 55 or
Older, 2008, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 37 tbl.2.A1 (2010), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/
income_pop55/2008/index.html [https://perma.cc/CZT2-9T6M].
47. For example, when Great Britain raised its pension retirement ages, the result was
a substantial decrease in overall income for women who were about to retire: they recouped
a little more than half of the income they would have earned from pension through continued
labor and other sources of income, but fell short otherwise and needed to reduce their consumption to make ends meet. Jonathan Cribb & Carl Emmerson, Can’t Wait to Get My
Pension: The Effect of Raising the Female Early Retirement Age on Income, Poverty, and
Deprivation, 18 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 450, 461, 468 (2019).
48. Deborah Thorne, Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless & Katherine Porter, Graying of
U.S. Bankruptcy: Fallout from Life in a Risk Society, 90 SOCIO. INQUIRY 681, 698 tbl.4 (2020).
49. See Darla Mercado, Retiring This Year? How Much You’ll Need for Health-Care Costs,
CNBC, (July 18, 2019, 12:55 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/18/retiring-this-year-howmuch-youll-need-for-health-care-costs.html [https://perma.cc/7FAE-XXQA].
50. Thorne et al., supra note 48, at 683-86, 692-97.
51. Caroline F. Pearson, Charlene C. Quinn, Sai Loganathan, A. Rupa Datta, Beth
Burnham Mace & David C. Grabowski, The Forgotten Middle: Many Middle-Income Seniors
Will Have Insufficient Resources for Housing and Health Care, 38 HEALTH AFFS. 851, 857
(2019).
52. Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1059 & n.52 (2008).
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compared to those of younger people, the security and stability of
the home and other real property becomes only more salient for
those older individuals.53 The ability to devise that significant asset
to one’s children or chosen beneficiaries is also a meaningful way in
which elderly people can provide for their loved ones at and after
their deaths.
Finally, older people, simply by virtue of their age, have shorter
time horizons (and higher discount rates) than younger people.54
This is not to say that older people have no interest in the future
beyond their deaths; of course, their testamentary behavior demonstrates the care they have for their descendants’ well-being, and
having children may actually lengthen the time horizons of elderly
people.55 But it ought to be self-evident that their own financial
needs, their interests in the state of their living circumstances, and
the time available to personally enjoy their property necessarily
extend only so far into the future.56 That is, it is only natural for
people to be more impatient to consume in the short term as their
expectations of the long term shrink.57 This dynamic helps explain
why older people are more focused on the immediate consequences
of their choices than the longer-term consequences.58 By contrast,
the behavior and interests of younger property owners can be
53. See Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 628 (2002) (reviewing WILLIAM
A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001)) (“[I]t is likely that
older homeowners are more risk-averse home[owners], due to the declining value of their
remaining human capital and their increasing share of personal wealth in home equity.”).
54. Cf. Boni-Saenz, Diversity, supra note 4, at 329 (arguing that elderly people have “little
individual incentive” to address issues like climate change because “they will only see ... the
costs and none of the benefits”).
55. See Don Bellante & Carole A. Green, Relative Risk Aversion Among the Elderly, 13
REV. FIN. ECON. 269, 273 (2004).
56. Cf. YOU CAN’T TAKE IT WITH YOU (Columbia Pictures 1938).
57. See David Huffman, Raimond Maurer & Olivia S. Mitchell, Time Discounting and
Economic Decision-Making Among the Elderly 9-10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 22438, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22438 [https://perma.cc/6Q8X-SVA6]
(finding higher discount rates among elderly people and offering data “suggest[ing] that rates
of impatience rise with age”).
58. See Daniel Read & N.L. Read, Time Discounting over the Lifespan, 94 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 22, 29-31 (2004); see also Heidi Bruderer
Enzler, Andreas Diekmann & Reto Meyer, Subjective Discount Rates in the General
Population and Their Predictive Power for Energy Saving Behavior, 65 ENERGY POL’Y 524, 529
(2014) (also finding that middle-aged people have low discount rates compared to elderly
people).
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expected to be shaped by the knowledge—or at least the hope—that
they have relatively more years to live, to enjoy their property, and
to see investments bear fruit.59 There is also some recent neurobiological evidence that certain cognitive impairments associated
with aging cause older individuals to have higher discount rates.60
In the discussion that follows, we will show how these three
attributes of elderly people—higher relocation costs, inelastic
incomes, and shortened time horizons—underlie the particularly
imperfect fit between key property doctrines and an aging population. The implications for older people of all races, sexes, and
backgrounds are significant, and they also of course intersect with
the consequences of numerous other aspects of property law that, as
discussed, have excluded and subordinated people of color, women,
and more.61 To be clear, we do not contend here that property law in
its totality is biased against elderly residents, though that may well
be the case. And because of space considerations we will not address
other relevant aspects of property law. Elsewhere we consider aspects of property law like zoning rules governing the construction of
accessory dwelling units and long-term care facilities.62 Instead, our
claim is more modest, and easier to assess: important parts of property doctrine are insufficiently attentive to differences that strongly
correlate with aging, and unnecessary human suffering results from
its rigidly one-size-fits-all approach.

59. See Read & Read, supra note 58, at 23. This is not to say that younger property owners
always behave responsibly with their property. Their long time horizons may just as well encourage irresponsible behavior on the theory that they have plenty of time to remedy youthful
indiscretions.
60. Bryan D. James, Patricia A. Boyle, Lei Yu, S. Duke Han & David A. Bennett,
Cognitive Decline Is Associated with Risk Aversion and Temporal Discounting in Older Adults
Without Dementia, PLOS ONE, April 2, 2015, at 5; Kameko Halfmann, William Hedgcock &
Natalie L. Denburg, Age-Related Differences in Discounting Future Gains and Losses, 6 J.
NEUROSCIENCE PSYCH. & ECON. 42, 49-50 (2013).
61. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 1, at 1715-24.
62. A companion project coauthored by one of us examines housing law’s treatment of
the elderly, focusing on zoning rules that prohibit the construction of long-term care facilities,
and policies designed to help the elderly age in place, such as zoning rules facilitating the
construction of accessory dwelling units. See Joanna L. Martin & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Scaling Down Senior Living: The Post-Pandemic Future of Elderly Housing, in LAW AND THE
HUNDRED YEAR LIFE (Anne Alstott & Abbe Gluck eds., forthcoming 2022) (on file with
authors).
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We begin in Part I with a discussion of just compensation under
the Constitution’s Takings Clause, focusing on how high relocation
costs mean that fair market value systematically undercompensates
older people. Part II examines the doctrine of waste and life tenancies. Relocation costs matter here too, but the inelasticity of
income and shortened time horizons for elderly life tenants loom
particularly large. Part III examines landlord-tenant law, where
high relocation costs and inelastic incomes again combine to make
elderly tenants especially vulnerable to landlord misbehavior. Part
IV revisits a classic question in the law of common interest
communities—whether homeowners’ associations should be able to
prohibit companion animals—and finds that existing contract-based
approaches underestimate the problems that arise for older owners
because of asymmetric relocation costs and, to a lesser extent, inelastic incomes. In each of these four domains, there is room for
institutional reforms that will better vindicate the property interests of older Americans, and we propose several such reforms and
identify a handful of jurisdictions that have implemented doctrinal
changes that are friendlier to the needs of the aged.
We suspect that some readers will not be swayed by some, or perhaps even all, of the normative proposals in this Article. The Article
nonetheless has something to offer those skeptical readers. As
America ages, its politics will change. Senior citizens, already wellrepresented in the electorate, will become more powerful still.63
Readers therefore can take our Article as a descriptive account of
where property law may be going thanks to looming demographic
changes.
Part V concludes with a body of law, the Fair Housing Act’s
exemptions for age-restricted communities, that has tried to protect
older people from some of the failures of their home communities to
provide appealing environments in which to age. In responding to
the needs of these elderly homeowners and the real estate developers who have catered to them, however, the law has arguably overcorrected in providing senior citizens with special protections that
have produced striking racial segregation in these communities.
That conclusion demands nuance, though, as we identify some
63. See generally Nora Super, Three Trends Shaping the Politics of Aging in America, 30
PUB. POL’Y & AGING REP. 39, 43-44 (2020).
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aspects of aging that might make racial segregation in age-restricted communities a qualitatively different phenomenon than
racial segregation in neighborhoods with high workforce participation rates.
I. TAKINGS COMPENSATION AND THE ELDERLY OWNER
Eminent domain is the mechanism by which government can
acquire title to—or “take”—privately held real or personal property.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and parallel provisions of the states’ constitutions limit the
exercise of that power by requiring that the government act for a
public use and compensate the person whose property has been
“taken.”64 For an older homeowner with the misfortune of having
their property taken, the measure of compensation is a hugely
consequential matter. Often without current employment income,
with limited human capital in the form of future earning capacity,
and with increasing medical care costs, the family home represents
the majority of their accumulated wealth and may make the difference between staying afloat financially or sinking into bankruptcy.65
Under current doctrine, compensation in federal takings law “is
for the property,” not the person.66 And it has become axiomatic in
federal takings law that the compensation owed is simply “to be
measured by ‘the market value of the property at the time of the
taking.’”67 Note, however, that “nothing in the Constitution” defines
the measure of compensation; it is “purely a matter of judge-made
law.”68 In turn, the U.S. Supreme Court has tended to justify its
compensation standard—one which asks only “‘what a willing buyer
64. U.S. CONST. amend. V; e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; FLA.
CONST. art. X, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7(a); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17.
65. Zhao & Burge, supra note 45, at 232; Thorne et al., supra note 48, at 697-98.
66. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).
67. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (quoting Olson v. United
States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)); see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 625 (2001);
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1943).
68. James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 866.
In fact, Wanling Su makes the case that the word “just” in the Takings Clause “was
historically understood to ensure procedural fairness” and to guarantee homeowners “the
right to a jury” in takings cases. Wanling Su, What Is Just Compensation?, 105 VA. L. REV.
1483, 1490 (2019) (emphasis added).
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would pay in cash to a willing seller’ at the time of the taking”—in
two ways.69
The first is by pointing to the need for a “practical”70 and “relatively objective working rule.”71 While appraisals, tax assessments,
and the like give market value a certain predictability and rationality, the argument goes, considering an owner’s subjective attachments or even an objective evaluation of the dislocation an owner
might experience lacks the “external validity which makes it a fair
measure of public obligation” to pay compensation.72 Even still, the
Court has admitted that application of the market value standard
nonetheless “involves, at best, a guess by informed persons,”
particularly where the property at issue or other comparable
property in the area “has not in fact been sold within recent times,
or in significant amounts.”73
The second justification is a more theoretical one. This argument
begins from the premise that the purpose of the compensation
requirement is not to make the property owner whole in every
respect, but rather to put him “in as good a position pecuniarily as
if his property had not been taken.”74 Indeed, the Court has candidly
“acknowledged that such an award [based on market value] does
not necessarily compensate or all values an owner may derive from
his property,” including in particular an owner’s subjective attachments or sources of value.75 But, this argument goes, that is by
design. Because one of the “burden[s] of common citizenship” is that
69. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (quoting Miller, 317
U.S. at 374). We focus here on the justifications offered for the market-value measure of
compensation, and take as settled the justifications offered for the payment of compensation
itself. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1223 (1967); see also
Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 239, 24849 (2007) (framing takings compensation as “corrective justice”).
70. Miller, 317 U.S. at 374.
71. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511.
72. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949); see Kirby Forest Indus.
v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 n.15 (1984); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372,
377-78 (1946); Olson, 292 U.S. at 255.
73. Miller, 317 U.S. at 374-75. Thomas Merrill has argued that the problem in fact pervades the compensation analysis and renders it largely “an opinion or educated guess.”
Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 110, 116-17
(2002).
74. Olson, 292 U.S. at 255 (emphasis added).
75. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511; see Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. at 377.
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“all property” is liable to “condemnation for the common good,” the
public is said to have no broader obligation to account for “loss to
the owner of nontransferable values deriving from his unique need
for property or idiosyncratic attachment to it.”76 But on this
justification, too, the Court has demonstrated at times faint-hearted
commitment and cautioned that “when market value [is] too
difficult to find, or when its application would result in manifest
injustice to owner or public,” some other standard is warranted.77
The Court has therefore emphasized that the overarching question
is this: “What compensation is ‘just’ both to an owner whose
property is taken and to the public that must pay the bill?”78
While the states are all free to arrive at some higher measure of
compensation under their own constitutions or statutes, they have
generally mirrored the Court’s approach and held that the measure
of compensation for a taking is the fair market value of the property
taken.79 For example, the California Supreme Court has held, first,
that under its state constitution, the measure of just compensation
“is often determined by the ‘fair market value’ of what has been
lost,” and second, that “there is no rigid or fixed standard that is
appropriate in all settings.”80 Illinois’ Supreme Court has held that
“the owner shall receive the market value of his property at the time
of the taking.”81 And New York’s courts likewise measure the compensation owed under that state’s constitution with reference to
“market value,” or “the amount which one desiring but not compelled to purchase will pay under ordinary conditions to a seller who
desires but is not compelled to sell.”82
76. Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 5; see Miller, 317 U.S. at 375.
77. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950).
78. Id.; 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 512-13 (ultimately rejecting claim for compensation above market value but discussing this approach favorably); United States v. Va.
Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961) (observing that market value is “not an absolute
standard nor an exclusive method of valuation”).
79. See 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 135 (2021) (compiling citations). Some states, as
well as the federal government, offer statutory relocation expenses in some circumstances. See
infra note 128 and accompanying text. Sometimes these relocation expenses have been considered to be constitutionally required. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(5); Jacksonville
Expressway Auth. v. Henry G. Du Pree Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 292 (Fla. 1958). Sometimes they
have not been. See, e.g., Klopping v. City of Whittier, 500 P.2d 1345, 1357 n.7 (Cal. 1972).
80. Prop. Rsrv., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 375 P.3d 887, 918 (Cal. 2016).
81. Sanitary Dist. of Chi. v. Chapin, 80 N.E. 1017, 1019 (Ill. 1907).
82. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Longridge Assocs., 997 N.Y.S. 2d 461, 463 (App. Div. 2014).
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A few states, however, have enacted some form of compensation
above market value when the property in question is a family home.
Michigan amended its constitution in 2006 to, among other things,
guarantee compensation above fair market value when the property
being taken is a person’s “principal residence.”83 In that case, “the
amount of compensation made and determined for that taking shall
be not less than 125% of that property’s fair market value, in
addition to any other reimbursement allowed by law.”84 In the same
year, Missouri enacted by statute a similar 25 percent premium for
primary residences,85 along with a 50 percent premium for property
of any type that had been “owned within the same family for fifty or
more years.”86 Likewise, Indiana adopted a statute that provides a
25 percent premium for “agricultural land” and a 50 percent premium for “residential property.”87 And Connecticut and Rhode
Island provided by statute for compensation above fair market
value—25 percent and 50 percent, respectively—when property,
whether residential or not, is taken for economic development
purposes.88
With these noteworthy exceptions, though, eminent domain law
under both federal and state law considers the measure of compensation to be an “objective” inquiry centered—even if at times
tweaked—on the market value of the property in question in an
arms-length sale between two parties without any distinct characteristics.89 It is, however, widely understood by scholars and some
judges that this measure of compensation is incomplete because it
fails to account for subjective value, loss of autonomy, and more.90
83. MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2.
84. Id.; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 213.23(5) (2021).
85. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 523.001(3), 523.039(2) (2021).
86. Id. §§ 523.001(2), 523.039(3).
87. IND. CODE § 32-24-4.5-8 (2019).
88. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-129(a)(2) (2021); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-64.12-8(a) (2021). Maine
altogether prohibits by statute the nonconsensual taking by a municipality of an owneroccupied residence for road construction purposes. ME. STAT. tit. 30-A, § 3101(1) (2021).
89. See Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465,
1474 (2008).
90. See, e.g., Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Ests., 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988)
(“[B]ecause of relocation costs, sentimental attachments, or the special suitability of the
property for their particular (perhaps idiosyncratic) needs, [many owners] value their property
at more than its market value (i.e., it is not ‘for sale’). Such owners are hurt when the
government takes their property and gives them just its market value in return.”); Heller &
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Margaret Jane Radin, in particular, has famously argued that,
when it comes to property that is nonfungible by virtue of its
personal value to the owner or that is constitutive of one’s personhood, market-value compensation will be “quite wrong” because the
property interests in question are simply “incommensurate with
money.”91 But even when courts have acknowledged as much, the
doctrine generally persists for reasons of administrability and
purported fairness to the public at large.92
Our aim here is not to argue that market value is the wrong
measure of compensation in general, nor is it our aim to argue that
subjective valuation ought to drive the measure of compensation
across the board.93 Rather, our aim is more modest: we consider an
objective recognition of the actual burdens and lost value that
distinctly befall elderly owners, which, as a rough rule, are predictably higher than those befalling younger owners.94
After all, a key purpose of the compensation requirement is often
said to be deterring government from excessive takings of property
and leading government “to make efficient takings decisions—to
take property only when the public benefits of the taking outweigh
the burdens and costs on the private owner.”95 Without such a
requirement, government might take property based only on an
Hills, supra note 89, at 1475; Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation
Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871, 873 (2007); Krier & Serkin, supra note 68, at 866; Lee Anne
Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 962-67 (2004);
Michelman, supra note 69, at 1214; cf. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Property Is Only
Another Name for Monopoly, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 51, 87 (2017). But see Nicole Stelle Garnett,
The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 111 (2006)
(arguing that scholars overstate the undercompensation problem and overlook ways outside
of the constitutional process in which governments make owners whole).
91. MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 154 (1993).
92. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
93. The literature is replete with various proposals to increase or change the measure of
compensation. See, e.g., Wyman, supra note 69, at 242 n.10, 256-61 (collecting sources and
proposals); Heller & Hills, supra note 89; Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 90; Fennell, supra
note 90; John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783,
803-19 (2006).
94. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 90, at 902 (theorizing that market-value
compensation “disproportionately undercompensates elderly owners”).
95. Michael C. Pollack, Taking Data, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 77, 121 (2019); see also Wyman,
supra note 69, at 246 (noting that takings compensation is “often described as a mechanism
that requires governments to bear the costs of takings, and thereby motivates governments
to make efficient decisions about whether to take property”).
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evaluation of its own benefits and without regard to the costs
imposed on the owner,96 and “would not feel incentives, created by
the price system, to use those resources efficiently.”97 To be sure,
there are reasons to doubt just how effective the compensation
requirement is at making government internalize the costs of
takings.98 But however effective the compensation requirement is or
is not in general, systematic distortions with respect to particular
groups of property owners mean that government’s eminent domain
activity will be especially inadequately or incorrectly deterred with
respect to those owners.99
Here, the unique costs for elderly people are those associated with
relocation. As discussed above, older Americans tend to be less
likely to move of their own accord; the relocation rate is three times
higher for a person age fifty-four and under than for a person over
fifty-five.100 So even if most people of all ages would not otherwise
find themselves moving in a given year, the government taking a
person’s home will result in an unplanned and likely unwanted
move three times as often when the owner is an older person.101 On
average, then, having one’s home taken is likely to be a qualitatively
different life event for an elderly person than it would be for a
younger person who is relatively more likely to have moved anyway.
96. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 56-57 (7th ed. 2007);
Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112
HARV. L. REV. 997, 1001 (1999); Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional
Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. L. REV. 859, 882-83 (1995); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban
Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 420 (1977); Michelman,
supra note 69, at 1218.
97. Heller & Krier, supra note 96, at 999.
98. See Wyman, supra note 69, at 247-48 (discussing factors that distort government’s
ability to internalize the costs of takings); cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay:
Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 359 (2000)
(arguing that there are significant obstacles that prevent government from responding to
monetary incentives).
99. Cf. Fee, supra note 93, at 790-92 (arguing that, “[b]ecause just compensation law
generally undervalues the home” in particular and as compared to business and investment
property, “it does not adequately deter government from using eminent domain against
homes”); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 90, at 883 (arguing that compensation measures
that fail to account for subjective value “will fail to incentivize the government properly”);
Heller & Hills, supra note 89, at 1468, 1481 (arguing that compensation measures that fail
to account for subjective value skew the government’s incentives).
100. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
101. See JCHS REPORT, supra note 16, at 25 (finding the same disparity in mobility rates).

584

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:561

Further, because amenities and fixtures become less fungible as
one ages,102 an older homeowner who loses her home due to eminent
domain and receives market value compensation may not be able to
find and afford a replacement home with the same necessary
features. After all, while those features might objectively be of great
value to an older homeowner, they may well not be for a younger or
even “average” homeowner and therefore may not be reflected in
fair market value compensation.103 Younger homeowners who are
dispossessed by eminent domain, by contrast, have less “locationspecific capital” (in other words, they can move homes without
suffering the same degree of welfare losses),104 and are likely more
indifferent when it comes to the need for and value of specific home
features. And because, as already discussed, community ties become
significantly more salient as one ages,105 the involuntary loss of a
home and its associated community ripples out into significant
secondary effects for physical and mental health and well-being.106
Finally, even if an elderly dispossessed homeowner were able to
locate an available substitute home that met her needs and was located in the same community, it is likely that she would be unable
to afford it.107 The reality is that neighborhoods ripe for redevelopment, and therefore targets of eminent domain, are so ripe precisely
because the properties are undervalued relative to what they could
fetch if put to a different use.108 They also disproportionately tend
102. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
103. Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 90, at 883 (noting that fair market value
compensation does not include subjective value).
104. Cf. Julie DaVanzo, Repeat Migration, Information Costs, and Location-Specific
Capital, 4 POPULATION & ENV’T. 45, 47 (1981). The term is adapted from a voluminous
literature in economics on firm-specific capital, which is the human capital an employee has
that is tied to their continued employment at a particular firm. See generally Boyan
Jovanovic, Firm-Specific Capital and Turnover, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1246 (1979).
105. See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
106. See Karl Manheim, Tenant Eviction Protection and the Takings Clause, 1989 WIS. L.
REV. 925, 943; Richard T. LeGates & Chester Hartman, Displacement, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 207, 236 (1981).
107. See LeGates & Hartman, supra note 106, at 211. Even the move itself and the process
of searching for a replacement home are likely to be taxing. See Budhu v. Grasso, 479
N.Y.S.2d 303, 306 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984) (“Moving often means harmful amounts of physical
effort for senior citizens and may be nearly impossible for the disabled.”); Cremin, supra note
30, at 417 (highlighting “the physical demands of searching for” new housing).
108. See DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN 185 (2003), https://ij.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/ED_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JAE9-YQPE] (similarly observing
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to be communities of color,109 which means that older people of color
are particularly subject to and harmed by the practice of eminent
domain.
In many of the sorts of communities that might try to improve
their fortunes through development assisted by eminent domain,
these elderly residents often find that, besides their own home, “few
residential options are available.”110 Affordable options are likely to
dwindle in the wake of a development project. After all, because the
purpose of the taking is often to redevelop the neighborhood and
increase the tax base by bringing in new business, creating jobs,
raising wages, et cetera, the consequence—often the intended consequence—is naturally to make property more expensive there.111 But
because market value compensation is measured at the time of the
taking, not after, it is based on the lower, pre-development value.112
This is all, of course, a reason why market value compensation is
criticized as being inadequate with respect to condemnees both
young and old alike.113 But the increased reliance on community
resources and the increased attachment to the neighborhood that
the older condemnee feels—and the more dramatic consequences
that attend the older condemnee’s loss— make the inadequacy of
market value compensation all the more dramatic.114 The added
racial disparity in takings and in the enjoyment of the opportunities
made available after the development (or lack thereof) noted above
only puts into sharper relief the inadequacy of the compensation.115
that “cities and developers look for areas of older neighborhoods in good locations” and noting
they are “less expensive to condemn”). Indeed, there is even some evidence to suggest that
low-value properties receive compensation that is less than market value, while high-value
properties receive more than market value. See Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of
Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON. 473, 488 (1976).
109. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 522 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(cataloging racially disparate nature of development takings); Brief for National Ass’n for the
Advancement of Colored People et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7-15, Kelo,
545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108) [hereinafter NAACP Brief of Amici Curiae] (describing the
disproportionate burden of eminent domain on people of color, economically disadvantaged
people, and elderly people).
110. Norris-Baker & Scheidt, supra note 22, at 184.
111. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483.
112. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984).
113. See Fennell, supra note 90, at 965-66.
114. See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
115. See NAACP Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 109, at 13 (“[W]hen an area is taken for
‘economic development,’ the underprivileged, racial and ethnic minorities, and the elderly are
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One response is that, even if an elderly condemnee’s compensation award is inadequate to purchase another home in the neighborhood, it might be adequate to rent another residence in the neighborhood for the remaining time in his or her life. That response has
some force, but rental housing is an imperfect substitute. First, it is
not an asset that can appreciate, be devised, or be leveraged as collateral in the case of unexpected health or other costs.116 Second,
there is some evidence that homeownership itself is associated with
better health outcomes for elderly people. One study published in
the Journal of Gerontology found that older homeowners were 30
percent less likely to enter a nursing home than those who did not
own their home.117 Perhaps even more importantly, those homeowners had 1.3 times the odds of recovering enough to exit the
nursing home after entering.118
Of course, drawing causal conclusions here is complicated, and
the authors of the study acknowledge that an owned home and the
inheritable value it represents might perversely lead one’s potential
heirs to minimize costs and prematurely terminate nursing home
expenses.119 But particularly in light of the data discussed above, it
seems plausible that homeownership represents for the older person community assistance, a “sense of attachment[,] ... competence[,] and control,” all of which can make one healthier, happier,
and more supported in living independently.120
So, with all of this in mind, we propose providing older condemnees with a measure of compensation that is not simply the
driven out of their own neighborhoods, unable to afford to live in the ‘revitalized’ community.”). See generally John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them the Old “OneTwo”: Gentrification and the K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 HOW. L.J. 433
(2003) (discussing the dislocation and consequent harms that flow from redevelopment efforts
to people of color).
116. Jann Swanson, Looking for Affordable Housing? UI Says Look to Homeownership,
MORT. NEWS DAILY (May 24, 2021, 12:23 PM), http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/05242021_
housing_affordability.asp [https://perma.cc/44YG-4WPP].
117. See Vernon L. Greene & Jan I. Ondrich, Risk Factors for Nursing Home Admissions
and Exits: A Discrete-Time Hazard Function Approach, 45 J. GERONTOLOGY S250, S255
(1990).
118. Id. at S256.
119. Id. at S257.
120. Id.; see NAACP Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 109, at 14 (noting that “the elderly
strongly prefer independent living in their own homes to other alternatives” and collecting
sources); JCHS REPORT, supra note 16, at 11, 26.
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market value of the property taken. Though our motivation is
similar to that of states like Michigan, Missouri, and the others
discussed above that award fixed premiums for condemned residential property across the board, we depart from that model for
two reasons.121
First, these premiums are likely to disproportionately benefit
younger homeowners with outstanding mortgages. A 20 percent
premium on a home with a $200,000 market value and a $160,000
mortgage is a bonus equivalent to the homeowner’s entire equity.
The same premium on the same home owned by an older condemnee who has paid off her mortgage is a bonus equivalent to only 20
percent of her equity.
Second, because our focus is less on the property’s status and
more on the owner’s—a concededly less straightforward question—
we suggest that judges adjudicating takings cases and interpreting
applicable constitutional commands, or legislatures deciding what
sorts of super-constitutional compensation will be offered, should
take account of the condemnee’s age, length of tenure in the home,
vulnerability, community ties, and ability to acquire other suitable
housing in the neighborhood. And they should aim to award enough
compensation as to empower the elderly condemnee to remain in
the neighborhood and preserve her interpersonal and spatial relationships. This measure of compensation would better reflect the
actual costs imposed on an older condemnee. It would force the
government to internalize the true costs of the taking and thereby
more appropriately deter and shape the government’s activity.122 By
rewarding only longtime owners, it would discourage arbitrage
whereby land that is slated for eminent domain would be sold to an
elderly owner to generate higher compensation.123 Finally, it would
ensure fairness and respect for the personhood and independence of
older owners.
121. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. Similarly, and similarly not speaking
about elderly people in particular, John Fee suggests that government be made to pay
homeowners “market value plus X percent of the home’s market value, where X depends on
how long the owner has lived in the home.” Fee, supra note 93, at 815. Because more factors
besides the property’s status as a home are at play here, we do not offer a similar formula, but
the motivation is comparable.
122. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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While it is true that this approach would be less scientific than
the Supreme Court insists looking to market value is,124 the reality
remains that even market value measures are imprecise.125 As long
as courts are having to make “guess[es],”126 we suggest they might
at least consider as well a “guess” as to the true costs borne by the
older condemnee.127 Federal and state law already allow for the
payment of more than market value in some circumstances—in the
form of residential and business relocation expenses and damages
for business interruption and loss of customer base.128 Our proposal
does not require too great a leap from these concessions already
made. Thus, regardless of what compensation floor the Supreme
Court says is required by the Constitution, or regardless of what
Congress decides, nothing stops state courts from interpreting the
demands of their own takings clauses along these lines or state
legislatures from choosing to award compensation along these lines
regardless of what their constitutions demand.129 Indeed, as noted
above, some states already have colored outside the lines of fair
market value.130
One objection is that, even given the distinct burdens elderly
condemnees face, it would be inappropriate or would engender new
unfairness to provide them compensation above market value.131
124. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
125. See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 683-84 (2005).
126. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1943).
127. Cf. Krier & Serkin, supra note 68, at 866 (suggesting, by way of addressing a different
problem in takings law, that, because the Constitution does not define the measure of compensation, “courts can use their power to alter the measure of compensation as a means to
guard against” abusive or problematic results).
128. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4622, 4630 (providing for relocation expenses); Fee, supra note 93,
at 791-93 (discussing these payments); Garnett, supra note 90, at 121-24 (discussing federal
and state law relocation and business interruption payment requirements, as well as relocation assistance programs, and collecting state statutes); Serkin, supra note 125, at 687-88
& n.47 (noting state law rules that award consequential damages). A number of state
constitutions also contain a compensation provision applicable when government “damages”
private property. See generally Maureen E. Brady, The Damagings Clauses, 104 VA. L. REV.
341 (2018).
129. See generally JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018) (calling for states and advocates to innovate and
experiment with rights protections under state constitutions).
130. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
131. As noted earlier, one might contend that a more fair or efficient way to address the
burdens elderly condemnees face would be to minimize their relocation costs rather than
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There are two important responses. The first is that our proposal
does not offer older condemnees a flat premium. Rather, it is meant
to enable older condemnees to seek, and judges to award, compensation based on the actual degree of their heightened dislocation.
Accordingly, for example, an elderly condemnee who is a newcomer
to the neighborhood and has other significant financial resources
probably will not receive extra compensation under this proposal.
Older condemnees with more limited resources, higher degrees of
community ties, or in more rapidly gentrifying real estate markets,
by contrast, would be the primary beneficiaries. And while the
added compensation would come out of taxpayers’ pockets, we submit that these particular burdens of condemnation are not fairly
shouldered by elderly condemnees and ought instead to be shouldered broadly by the taxpayers in the form of targeted, heightened
compensation.132
The second response is that laws that protect or even privilege
older people in ways different from their younger counterparts are
not uncommon—consider the Social Security Act and the Medicare
Act—and are often justified on the basis that, throughout one’s lifecycle, one can expect both to be burdened by these laws (when one
is a younger taxpayer) and to be benefited by them (when one is
older).133 That is, the unfairness that may appear at a given period
of time is mitigated because, across periods of time, everyone can
expect to get both the short and long end of the stick. For the same
increase their compensation. But because alleviating many of the burdens faced by elderly
condemnees is not especially within the power of the law or would impose significant costs on
the government, compensating for these losses may often be the best way to feasibly and
efficiently account for them. See supra notes 22-40 and accompanying text.
132. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (“[J]ust compensation was
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”).
133. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (per curiam)
(subjecting age-based classifications to only rational basis review because old age “marks a
stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal span”); Boni-Saenz, Discrimination,
supra note 4, at 870-75 (discussing temporal equality). Of course, it would hardly be justifiable
to require all young people to turn over the entirety of their incomes to elderly people on the
theory that the shoe will one day be on the other foot. Moment-to-moment injustices may be
softened by later rewards, yet they are rarely erased. See Boni-Saenz, Vulnerability, supra
note 4, at 176. But this proposal, like the others in this Article, is meant to be tailored to the
source of the harm and the extent of actually differing needs while minimizing collateral
consequences.
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reason, insofar as one is concerned that laws designed to protect a
given class might contribute to the stigmatization of that class—a
proposition with which one might well globally take issue in any
event—that concern is implicated less saliently where, as here, the
law operates to distribute privileges across time rather than across
people.
A related objection is that, because the homeownership rate is
significantly higher for white Americans than for Black Americans,134 one effect of enabling older owners to receive heightened
compensation is a redistribution of wealth from Black taxpayers to
elderly white homeowners. We readily concede this problem. But
rather than proceed to deny the needs of older homeowners—of all
races—it strikes us as more appropriate to couple our proposal here
with targeted taxing and spending policies designed to increase the
rate of Black homeownership and to directly mitigate racial inequities more broadly.135
One final concern is that providing above-market compensation
has the potential to alter the political dynamics of eminent domain
and cause older property owners to support or even invite takings.136
To start, it is important not to overstate the political power of
elderly people and associated lobbying interests like the AARP.
Though there is evidence that older people tend to participate in
local government more than younger people,137 there is also some
evidence suggesting that the political power of older people is more
potent at the state level than at the local level, particularly with
respect to land use law.138 But it is at the local level that specific
takings decisions are often made.139 There is, therefore, some reason
134. At the end of 2019, the homeownership rate for white non-Hispanic Americans was
73.7 percent, while the rate for Black Americans was 44 percent. Quarterly Residential
Vacancies and Homeownership, First Quarter 2021, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr. 27, 2021),
https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BEJ-3FHT].
135. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient
than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) (noting that
redistribution is better accomplished through tax and transfer programs rather than legal
rules that are slanted to benefit the less fortunate).
136. See Garnett, supra note 90, at 142-43.
137. See Katherine Levine Einstein, Maxwell Palmer & David M. Glick, Who Participates
in Local Government? Evidence from Meeting Minutes, 17 PERSPS. ON POL. 28, 29 (2019).
138. See Brinig & Garnett, supra note 32, at 539.
139. See, e.g., Michael C. Pollack, Reallocating Redevelopment Risk, 73 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 7-18), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=37
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to wonder about the precise degree to which older property owners
are actually altering the landscape of local takings decisions.
Even assuming older owners do exert substantial power in land
use decision-making and that our proposal would mean increasing
their support for takings, the normative valence of that consequence
likely turns to some degree on one’s view about the current state of
things. That is, if there is currently an optimal amount and distribution of takings, then offering heightened compensation for older
owners might engender rent-seeking and the pursuit of projects that
are not socially beneficial. But if there is presently too much opposition to socially beneficial projects, then breaking down that
opposition with larger compensation awards would be desirable.
Indeed, it is quite possible that the prevailing failure to provide
above-market compensation to elderly owners inefficiently deters
otherwise socially beneficial exercises of eminent domain by making
socially desirable takings especially politically toxic—either because
elderly owners are in fact able to overcome broad local support for
exercises of eminent domain or because they are sympathetic symbols around which opponents of eminent domain can rally.
For example, takings opponents of all ages made much of the fact
that Wilhelmina Dery, one of the owners dispossessed by the taking
at issue in Kelo v. City of New London, was an elderly woman (age
eighty-seven at the time of the Supreme Court’s decision) who had
lived in her house for her entire life.140 An above-market compensation award for Ms. Dery might have helped neutralize the political opposition that eventually helped sink a project that the Supreme Court held could go forward.141 Insofar as some of the most
salient obstacles to the efficient use of eminent domain since Kelo
have similarly been political rather than financial, increased compensation for the most sympathetic and most inconvenienced
property owners has the potential to lead to better land use decisions.

97297 [https://perma.cc/JLE2-WD79] (collecting examples).
140. See 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005).
141. See id. at 489-90.
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II. WASTE, PARTITION, AND THE ELDERLY LIFE TENANT
We showed in Part I how the particularly high relocation costs
faced by older people should inform the question of how much
compensation they are due if their property is taken. Our next example, involving the powers of life tenants, is one in which high
relocation costs are sometimes present but play second fiddle to the
relatively inelastic income and shortened time horizons of elderly
occupiers of property. Thus, beginning with these two Parts, we can
begin to understand the role of all three of the particular attributes
of elderly people we identify, and then in the Parts that follow we
will see how different mixes of these attributes give rise to divergent
policy prescriptions.
A large body of property law has arisen to manage potential
conflicts between those who have possessory interests and future
interests in land.142 The law of waste is the key mechanism that
common law courts have developed to ensure that the holder of the
possessory estate does not squander the land’s value, leaving the
future interest holder with a diminished asset.143 Because so many
life tenants are elderly, the problems associated with life estate
conflicts often arise in situations involving senior citizens.144
During the twentieth century, the life estate fell out of fashion as
an estate planning tool, so much so that influential legal texts
regularly advised against creating a life estate and strongly recommended the use of a trust instead.145 In recent years, life
tenancies have reemerged as a popular estate planning strategy,
142. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MICHAEL H.
SCHILL & LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, PROPERTY 279 (9th ed. 2018).
143. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 Third Assocs., 14 F.3d 114, 119-20 (2d Cir. 1994). See
generally Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist
Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653 (2006).
144. See, e.g., Fehringer v. Fehringer, 367 S.W.2d 781, 782-83 (Tenn. 1963) (involving a
seventy-seven-year-old life tenant moving for partition). Life estates are frequently created
by a testator in favor of their widow or widower, who will often be of a similar age as the
decedent. Testators will rarely create remainder interests that follow estates held by youthful
life tenants because the remainders are unlikely to become possessory until several decades
after the testator’s death.
145. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 142, at 279 (“A trust is a more flexible and
usually more desirable property arrangement than a legal life estate.”).

2021]

PROPERTY LAW FOR THE AGES

593

notwithstanding the concerns of lawyers about the coordination
problems that they create.146 The use of a life estate now has significant tax advantages and benefits for senior citizens who are
trying to qualify for Medicaid to pay for long-term care while still
transferring some wealth to their children.147 As a result, the life
estate is enjoying a resurgence of popularity.148
Obviously, older life tenants’ shorter time horizons make the
potential for conflict between the life tenant and remaindermen
relatively significant.149 As we will show, however, the higher relocation costs and inelastic incomes faced by elderly people loom
large in the law of waste as well.150
Waste cases often follow a predictable pattern. A life tenant
wishes to harvest real property resources in order to provide for her
pressing contemporary needs, and a future interest holder, who we
will refer to as the remainderman here, objects that such utilization
of the land will leave him with land that is less valuable.151 Though
many of the most famous waste cases date to the nineteenth
century, when trusts were less frequently used, these types of
disputes remain common in our day and age.152 Waste doctrine
includes instances of voluntary waste (the party in possession
affirmatively alters the nature of the property, for example, by
chopping down trees or removing minerals) as well as permissive
waste (omissions reduce the value of property, for example, when
the party in possession fails to maintain a building prudently or lets
termites infest a home).153 An elderly individual in possession might
be tempted to commit either voluntary waste or permissive waste.
Consider shorter time horizons, for example. An older life tenant
might use land in a non-sustainable way that strips resources from
146. See Jay A. Soled & Letha Sgritta McDowell, Life Estates Reconsidered, 33 QUINNIPIAC
PROB. L.J. 45, 46-49 (2019).
147. Id. at 56; Brian E. Barreira, Proper Medicaid Planning May Permit Keeping the Home
in the Family, 28 EST. PLAN. 177, 182 (2001).
148. See Soled & McDowell, supra note 146, at 56.
149. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 16-53 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Modlin v. Kennedy, 53 Ind. 267, 268-69 (1876).
152. See, e.g., Jackson v. Don Johnson Forestry, Inc., 830 S.E.2d 659, 663-66 (N.C. Ct. App.
2019) (involving an appeal between an elderly life tenant in a nursing home who authorized
timber harvesting on the estate despite the objections of the remaindermen).
153. See id. at 664.
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it because she does not care about the land’s residual value (voluntary waste) or an older life tenant might engage in permissive
waste, figuring that she cannot be certain to see through a timeintensive project to completion, so she will let the remainderman
initiate and complete the necessary renovations that will stop the
property’s deterioration (permissive waste).154
We will consider affirmative waste first. Black letter doctrine
governing affirmative waste can be harsh.155 Suppose a life tenant
substantially improves the land during his lifetime, building permanent structures on it like houses and barns. Towards the end of
his life, he tries to sell the structures to the remainderman, who
fails to offer him a price he deems fair, so he removes the structures
with plans to reuse the building materials elsewhere. The courts
deem this waste, even if the vacant property delivered to the remainderman appreciated in value during the life tenant’s occupancy.156 One might worry that such a rule has bad ex ante effects,
discouraging investment. But the law reasons that these “exertions
are the voluntary gift of the life-tenant, to the inheritance; he
dedicates them to the inheritance, when he has enjoyed the fruits of
his labor. A good farmer creates, but does not destroy.”157
There are a few exceptions to basic doctrines that prohibit what
would otherwise be affirmative waste by life tenants. The open
mines doctrine is the most important exception, and it is nicely illustrated by Lee & Bradshaw v. Rogers.158 In that case, the testator
had been tapping his trees, and upon his death he directed that his
widow take a life estate in the timberland.159 The process of draining the sap from the trees to create turpentine appeared to have
damaged the trees somewhat, and on this basis the trial court
granted the remaindermen an injunction.160 The Georgia Supreme
Court reversed, holding that if the process of extracting sap to make
turpentine had begun under its previous owner, then the life
154. Both types of waste are alleged in some of the cases, such as Dozier v. Gregory, 46 N.C.
100, 105 (1853).
155. See, e.g., McCullough v. Irvine’s Ex’rs, 13 Pa. 438, 442 (1850).
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. 108 S.E. 371 (Ga. 1921).
159. Id. at 371-72.
160. Id. at 372.
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tenant’s continuation of those same uses could not constitute
waste.161
The court felt this conclusion followed from earlier cases in which
timber harvesting that had begun prior to the life tenancy could
continue or minerals could continue to be extracted from already
existing mines, but the scope of timber harvesting could not expand
and new mines could not be opened by the life tenant.162 Some
courts have followed suit,163 but other tribunals have acted in a
manner that is hard to reconcile with the open mines doctrine.164
Having so much ride on the happenstance of whether a prior
owner got around to using timber or minerals for economic benefit
is hard to justify using economic logic. But the doctrine is best
understood as a recognition that courts can make mistakes when
determining whether a life tenant’s productive uses of land crosses
the line of non-sustainability.165 The open mines doctrine presents
a bright line rule that lowers the informational burden borne by
judges.166
An arguable second exception to the ordinary rules governing
waste is of special interest to us here. It arises when using land in
a way that diminishes its residual value for the remaindermen is
necessary for the life tenant’s comfort and support. Some jurisdictions, such as Georgia in Wright v. Conner, deem acts that would
otherwise constitute waste to be lawful when the life tenant’s
conduct was necessary to make “the life tenant[ ] comfortable.”167
161. Id. at 374.
162. Id. at 373-74; see M.K. Woodward, The Open Mine Doctrine in Oil and Gas Cases, 35
TEX. L. REV. 538, 538 (1957).
163. See, e.g., Merriman v. Moore, 600 S.W.2d 720, 724-25 (Tenn. 1980).
164. See, e.g., Threatt v. Rushing, 361 So. 2d 329, 331 (Miss. 1978) (holding that the
removal of a large portion of a parcel’s timber for commercial purposes constituted waste and
was not merely “good husbandry”); Clark v. Holden, 73 Mass. 8, 10-12 (1856); McCullough v.
Irvine’s Ex’rs, 13 Pa. 438, 443 (1850) (holding that the removal of a “reasonable medium”
quantity of timber would not constitute waste if the removal conformed with “the custom of
farmers”); Adams v. Adams, 371 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963) (implying no “open
mines”-like exception for timber). Still other jurisdictions moved away from the common law
approach towards a modern economic value test, tolerating forms of timber harvesting that
were deemed waste at common law when those actions result in a parcel whose value was
enhanced rather than diminished. See, e.g., Owen v. Hyde, 14 Tenn. 334, 339-40 (Sup. Ct. Err.
& App. 1834).
165. See Woodward, supra note 162, at 548.
166. See id.
167. 37 S.E.2d 353, 357 (Ga. 1946); see also Dorsey v. Moore, 6 S.E. 270, 271 (N.C. 1888)
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This understanding arises as a matter of law.168 Other jurisdictions,
such as Florida and Kentucky, have explicitly taken the advanced
age of widow life tenants into account in addressing potential ambiguities in wills concerning the scope of the authority conferred upon
them.169 After discussing the widows’ ages and circumstances, along
with evidence concerning their relationships to the relevant testators, both jurisdictions gave the widows expansive authority to
alienate property from the life tenancy, to the obvious detriment of
the remaindermen. These cases reflect an admirable sensitivity to
the inelastic income problem among elderly life tenants. Indeed, we
suspect there are other cases in which judges are naturally sympathetic to the interests of elderly people and that sympathy affects
their decisions. If such considerations are going to influence outcomes in cases, judges should be transparent about them. At the
same time, this kind of equitable exception is potentially significant
enough to swallow the doctrine of waste, at least with respect to life
tenants who find themselves in precarious financial straits.
That concern about the logical stopping point of a necessity
doctrine explains why some jurisdictions have rejected Wright’s
approach. Consider the Indiana Supreme Court’s precedent in
Robertson v. Meadors, in which a widowed life tenant occupied
thirty-one acres of land, only six of which were being cultivated.170
Hoping to remain on a property she was presumably attached to but
facing financial ruin, the life tenant cleared five more acres so they
too could be cultivated, using nearly all of the harvested timber for
heating fuel or for fence construction purposes on the property.171
The remaindermen sued for waste and won, securing damages and
(“[G]enerally the life-tenant may, if need be, clear tillable land to be cultivated for the
necessary support of himself and his family; and this he may do, although the ordinary forest
timber be destroyed in the course of clearing the land.... But it is waste to cut timber from the
land merely for sale.”).
168. We can contrast precedents like Wright from numerous other cases in which the terms
of a will explicitly provide a life tenant with the power to sell the property and use the
revenue resulting from the sale for the life tenant’s comfort and support. See, e.g., Kern v.
Kern, 136 N.E.2d 675, 678-79 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955); In re Britt’s Will, 71 N.Y.S.2d 405, 408
(App. Div. 1947); Beliveau v. Beliveau, 14 N.W.2d 360, 362 (Minn. 1944).
169. Marshall v. Hewett, 24 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1945); Dennis v. Trs. of Choateville Christian
Church, 290 S.W.2d 601, 601-02 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956).
170. Robertson v. Meadors, 73 Ind. 43, 44-45 (1880).
171. Id.

2021]

PROPERTY LAW FOR THE AGES

597

injunctive relief.172 The court was entirely unsympathetic to the
widow:
The [defendant’s] answer seems to have been drawn on the
theory that the extent of a life tenant’s rights depends on the
necessities of such tenant, a proposition which, if authoritatively
announced, would be somewhat startling, both to the profession
and to the owners of the fee, in such cases. The complaint shows
the cutting and removal ... to the irreparable injury of the fee
simple estate, and to the plaintiff as the owner thereof, which
clearly makes a case of actionable waste, and for injunction.173

Equities be damned.
At first approximation, it would seem that balancing the equities
is the attractive way to proceed. On one side of the ledger, we have
the urgent pleas of aged life tenants trying to sustain themselves off
of land they typically inherited from their spouse.174 On the other
hand, we have society’s interests in both treating the remaindermen
fairly and promoting sustainable uses of land more generally.175
These are both important interests, difficult—though not impossible—to balance.
There is a deeper problem with Robertson and the approach it
represents, though. The court gave essentially no thought to what
its ruling would mean for the widow’s bargaining position vis-à-vis
the remaindermen.176 After the court’s ruling, the remaindermen
would have all the leverage as the widow attempted to alienate her
ownership interest in a nonviable parcel of agricultural land. She
possessed an asset that could not sustain her unless its use rights
were reconfigured, and she was locked into a bilateral monopoly
with remaindermen who (1) could veto nearly anything she might
do and (2) had time on their side. In this environment, the actuarial
tables might show that a widow with a remaining life expectancy of
a dozen years could expect to receive 50 percent of the value of a fee
simple interest,177 but because the remaindermen could block the
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 45.
Id.
See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., id.
See id. at 43-45.
See Paul S. Lee, Comment, The Common Disaster: The Fifth Circuit’s Error in Estate
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sale of fee simple interest in the entirety of the property,178 the life
tenant might be forced to walk away with just a small fraction of
that. The widow’s shorter time horizon and inelastic income would
put her at the mercy of the remaindermen if they bargained.
Next, take permissive waste. Recall that permissive waste refers
to omissions rather than acts.179 It is easy to see how an aging population might result in an increase in permissive waste; as people
advance past a certain age their physical vigor often decreases and
they become more injury-prone, so a life tenant who was able to
provide for the upkeep on a house in her fifties might find doing so
harder in her eighties. Contracting with professionals for the upkeep would be a common solution to this problem, but of course that
option requires the life tenant to have financial resources. Another
potential solution—the life tenant simply abandoning her interest—is also not readily available because abandonment itself can
constitute permissive waste.180
Courts do not have a consistent approach when dealing with
elderly life tenants whose advanced age contributes to permissive
waste. Some courts view age-associated frailties as a factor that
may excuse permissive waste. In Underwood v. Lowe, an Ohio court
noted that the responsibilities of a life tenant were to engage in
reasonable and proper steps to maintain the property, and that “the
advanced age of the life tenant,” an older woman, must be taken
into account.181 Other jurisdictions implicitly reject context- and agesensitive inquiries by the courts. As the Connecticut Supreme Court
saw it in Zauner v. Brewer, or the Court of Appeals of Kentucky indicated in Prescott v. Grimes, the apparent advanced age of the defendant did not excuse the life tenant’s failure to take objectively
of Carter v. United States and the Glitch in the “Tax on Prior Transfer” Credit in Valuing Life
Estates Created in a Common Disaster, 40 EMORY L.J. 1269, 1273-74 (1991); DUKEMINIER ET
AL., supra note 142, at 273-74 (discussing the valuation of a life estate and remainder using
actuarial tables).
178. See, e.g., Baker v. Weedon, 262 So. 2d 641 (Miss. 1972) (refusing to order a complete
sale of real property desired by the elderly widow life tenant in light of the objections of the
remaindermen).
179. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
180. See Chapman v. Chapman, 526 So. 2d 131, 135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). For a
broader analysis of abandonment of real property, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to
Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355 (2010).
181. See Underwood v. Lowe, No. 83 CV 725, 1985 WL 7505, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 7,
1985).
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reasonable steps to maintain the property’s condition.182 The refusal
to personalize the legal duty based on the life tenant’s advanced age
was plausibly outcome determinative in both cases.183
When conflicts arise between contemporaneous holders of concurrent interests in land, like tenancies in common or joint tenancies, property doctrine has a well-established response. Namely, if
two or more co-owners find themselves locked into an unhappy
arrangement in which each can veto the land utilization plans of the
other, any co-owner can move to partition the property, either by
sale (an auction, with the proceeds split) or in kind (subdividing the
parcel).184 Partition in kind is well-suited to co-owners who face high
relocation costs, and partition by sale is well-suited to those who do
not.185 It is therefore surprising that no analogous partition remedy
exists to deal with the very similar kinds of conflicts that arise between life tenants and remaindermen. The closest tool available to
courts is the equitable power to order a sale when doing so is necessary to advance the interests of all parties or to prevent waste, but
both the necessity threshold and the requirement built into the doctrine that a sale represent a Pareto improvement for the life tenant
and remaindermen make such remedies rare.186
The law of waste shows how holders of successive interests in
land can become as interdependent as contemporaneous co-owners.
But the common law and applicable statutes are nearly uniform in
prohibiting the life tenant from partitioning the property so as to
generate a clean break between the possessor and future interest
holders.187 This differential treatment of co-owners versus present
and future interests poses a major puzzle: Why allow one party to
obtain a court order dissolving their interdependency in the coownership context but not in the future interests context?
182. Zauner v. Brewer, 596 A.2d 388, 394 (Conn. 1991); Prescott v. Grimes, 136 S.W. 206,
207 (Ky. Ct. App. 1911). In both cases we can find textual clues about the probably advanced
age of the life tenant, but the courts do not reference their seniority explicitly. See Zauner, 596
A.2d at 394 (defendant acknowledges that vegetation around swimming area had “got the
better of [her]” (alteration in original)); Prescott, 136 S.W. at 207 (life tenant acquired the
property in 1865 and died in 1908).
183. See Zauner, 596 A.2d at 394; Prescott, 136 S.W. at 207.
184. See, e.g., Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27, 29 (Conn. 1980).
185. See id.
186. See, e.g., Baker v. Weedon, 262 So. 2d 641, 643-44 (Miss. 1972).
187. See infra notes 198, 201-02 and accompanying text.
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Two responses present themselves but neither is satisfying. The
first is that partition between life tenants and the remaindermen is
contrary to the intent of the parties that created the future and
present interests, whereas parties that establish co-ownership relationships understand that partition exists when they do so. This
circular rejoinder is unpersuasive, however, because property law
has long recognized that the present and future interest holders,
acting together, can eliminate both interests and alienate a new fee
simple absolute interest in their place.188 It would require a very
high level of sophistication for a testator to understand that in
granting a descendant a future interest in land the testator is actually granting a veto right to that remainderman rather than a
future possessory interest. Yet that is how current law translates
the creation of a remainder interest into doctrine, notwithstanding
the lack of evidence that this result is consistent with actual testators’ intentions.189 So the legal question in cases of partition is not
whether the life tenant or remainderman can undo the grantor or
testator’s favored allocation of resources but whether the life tenant
can ask the courts to do so unilaterally. Or, put another way, is the
remainderman entitled to property rule protection or mere liability
rule protection for her future interest?190
A second possible justification for the law’s asymmetric treatment
of partition stems from an intuition that co-owners are more interdependent than present and future interest holders, so if the relationship goes sour it is more important for property doctrine to
facilitate exit. We believe the difference between co-owners on the
one hand, and present and future interest holders on the other, is
a difference of degree rather than kind. But here is the critical
point: the older the life tenant, the greater the interdependence problem becomes. That is, the shorter the life expectancy of the life
tenant, the weaker the incentive for the life tenant to improve the
property and the greater the temptation for the life tenant to
188. See D. Benjamin Barros, Toward a Model Law of Estates and Future Interests, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 36 (2009); Merrill Isaac Schnebly, Power of Life Tenant or
Remainderman to Extinguish Other Interests by Judicial Process, 42 HARV. L. REV. 30, 49
(1928).
189. See Schnebly, supra note 188, at 49.
190. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089 (1972).
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commit waste.191 Finally, as the remainderman’s anticipation of
taking possession soon increases, his incentive to drive a hard
bargain and engage in strategic behavior grows.192 So, particularly
with elderly life tenants, the need for them to coordinate with remaindermen becomes particularly acute. Partition actions would
help alleviate all these costs.193
Of course, while critiquing the asymmetric treatment of partition
actions between co-ownership and future interests, we do not mean
to suggest that asymmetric rules are never warranted. Providing a
life tenant with the right to move for partition by sale over the
remainderman’s objections does not necessitate giving the remainderman the same rights. After all, life tenants—particularly older
ones—will often face higher relocation costs; they are the ones with
expectations of present possession.194 Under these circumstances,
enabling the life tenant but not the remainderman to move for
partition makes sense. And where a life tenant’s use of her property
has become so impractical that she endeavors to relocate, the law
should be on the lookout for remaindermen who exercise their veto
rights strategically.
Though these questions are interesting and important, it has
been more than nine decades since any property scholar considered
the appropriateness of partition by life tenants at length.195 Merrill
Schnebly’s 1928 Harvard Law Review article was astute for its time,
but it predated the rise of social scientific approaches to the law, not
to mention changes in the nature of aging and the increase in the
elderly population.196 Though the property scholarship has essentially ignored this question, it has become a hot topic in courts
around the nation. We found a large number of published opinions
in which the efforts of life tenants to obtain partitions over the
objections of remaindermen were rebuffed by judges.197
191. Cf. Boni-Saenz, Diversity, supra note 4, at 328-29.
192. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
193. See Schnebly, supra note 188, at 49.
194. See supra notes 16-40 and accompanying text.
195. See Schnebly, supra note 188, at 30.
196. Compare id., with supra notes 29-34.
197. See, e.g., Maitland v. Allen, 594 S.E.2d 918, 920 (Va. 2004); Beach v. Beach, 74 P.3d
1, 3-5 (Colo. 2003); Peters v. Robinson, 636 A.2d 926, 931 (Del. 1994); Scottish Rite of
Indianapolis Found., Inc. v. Adams, 834 N.E.2d 1024, 1027 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Garcia-Tunon
v. Garcia-Tunon, 472 So. 2d 1378, 1379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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Judicial resistance to partition by life tenants persists even
though it lacks serious policy rationales and creates odd inconsistencies within property law. Indeed, consider the fact that, when a
life tenant holds an undivided cotenancy interest in land that is followed by a remainder interest, the life tenant is permitted to move
for partition, even though the life tenant who has possession of the
whole cannot.198 This happenstance makes it difficult to justify proscribing life tenancy partitions, at least in those situations where
valuing the possessory and remainder interests is straightforward.199 Further, permitting such partitions would not be impractical, seeing as the law already has mechanisms for determining the
economic value of a life estate in instances in which the life tenant
and remaindermen alienate the property voluntarily or lose it via
eminent domain.200 And still, the literature and case law provide
little justification for the rule prohibiting life tenants from moving
for partition, short of speculative efforts to minimize the problem201
or empty formalism.202
In recent years, a few jurisdictions have moved away from the
common law’s rigid resistance to partitions in suits brought by sole
life tenants. Rhode Island has permitted a partition by sale when
the state of the property was deteriorating and the life tenant
lacked the funds to maintain it.203 New York law permits a life tenant (or a remainderman) to force a sale over the objections of other
parties with an interest in the property if the moving party can
show that a sale is suitable, practical, and efficient, and that it
would further the provisions of the will.204 In at least one such case,
198. See, e.g., Fehringer v. Fehringer, 367 S.W.2d 781, 784 (Tenn. 1963); Hayden v.
McNamee, 63 N.E.2d 876, 882 (Ill. 1945).
199. Partition may be inappropriate in cases involving multiple nonstandard contingent
remainders or executory interests that would be difficult to price in a partition by sale.
200. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1427
(1974) (noting that if disputes arise between life tenants and remaindermen over the
appropriateness of improvements “they will rarely justify the kind of disentangling that is
accomplished by a partition suit” without offering additional analysis).
202. Beach does provide a persuasive normative defense of the result in that case, though
it is limited to the dispute’s rather unusual facts, in which the property at issue consisted of
a life tenancy in an addition that was attached to the remainderman’s home on land the
remainderman owned entirely. 74 P.3d at 5.
203. DeLisi v. Caito, 463 A.2d 167, 168-70 (R.I. 1983).
204. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1602 (McKinney 2021); In re Estate of Sauer, 753
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the New York courts have taken into account the advanced age of
the life tenant and his residence in an assisted living facility, ordering a sale.205 A few other jurisdictions have statutes that permit
a partition by sale if such partition would make both parties better
off,206 but these are generally useless provisions because if a sale
would indeed improve both parties’ positions, then there should be
no disagreement over whether to sell.207 Since the law has long allowed life tenants to get together with remaindermen to sell a fee
interest in property by mutual consent,208 the law’s resistance to
doing so upon one party’s motion winds up providing property protections to parties that either (a) engage in strategic behavior or (b)
believe that the value of real estate will appreciate more quickly
than other investments would. Remaindermen falling into the latter
category are often people who erroneously assume they can beat the
market.
N.Y.S.2d 318, 322 (Sur. Ct. 2002). But the life tenant must have compelling reasons for a sale,
and remaindermen sometimes win these cases, especially in cases where the will does not
seem to privilege the interests of the life tenant over that of the remaindermen. See, e.g., In
re Mantineo, No. 316274, 2007 WL 2076569, at *3 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. July 19, 2007).
205. See In re Strohe, No. 331708, 2004 WL 2903616, at *6 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Dec. 13, 2004),
subsequent determination, In re Estate of Strohe, 791 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Sur. Ct. 2005).
206. See, e.g., Williams v. Neb. Wesleyan Univ., 332 N.W.2d 694, 696 (Neb. 1983); Scottish
Rite of Indianapolis Found., Inc. v. Adams, 834 N.E.2d 1024, 1027 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
Williams reflects the obtuse way courts sometimes think about a forced sale, with a court
unduly focused on the costs of administering a diversified trust and insufficiently attentive
to the risks of holding a single, non-diversified piece of real estate in rural Richardson County,
Nebraska. See 332 N.W.2d at 696. California has a statute that permits “[p]artition as to
successive estates in the property ... if it is in the best interest of all the parties.” CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 872.710(c) (West 2021). The statute further notes that the
court shall consider whether the possessory interest has become unduly burdensome by reason of taxes or other charges, expense of ordinary or extraordinary
repairs, character of the property and change in the character of the property
since creation of the estates, circumstances under which the estates were created and change in the circumstances since creation of the estates, and all other
factors that would be considered by a court of equity having in mind the intent
of the creator of the successive estates and the interests and needs of the successive owners.
Id. The provision has not been interpreted in a published California decision, so we cannot
know whether a sale that makes a life tenant much better off and the remaindermen neither
worse off nor better off would satisfy the statute.
207. Such a provision might point towards a forced sale if one of the parties would be made
better off by a sale but is engaged in strategic behavior to extract more revenue from the
other. Yet there is no reason to think that courts will be able to identify this strategic behavior
accurately when it arises.
208. See Schnebly, supra note 188, at 49.
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New York and Rhode Island have it right. Permitting partition in
situations where a life tenant cannot use land productively helps
ensure that a resource is put to its highest and best use, removes
the need for life tenants and remaindermen to incur transaction
costs negotiating, promotes longterm investments in the property,
provides a check on inefficient strategic bargaining behaviors, and
likely serves the equitable interests of older life tenants. Liberalizing partition law to promote partitions by sale that represent
Kaldor-Hicks improvements strikes us as a doctrinal no-brainer.209
To be clear, this would be a new default rule rather than a mandatory rule. At common law, a testator could specify that a life
tenancy was granted without impeachment for waste, which would
permit a life tenant the sort of freedom of action normally reserved
for a fee simple owner,210 and under our proposed regime the
testator could instead direct the opposite—that waste remained off
limits and/or that unilateral efforts by the life tenant to partition
the property were prohibited. This design choice would empower the
idiosyncratic testator or grantor who did want to tie the hands of the
life tenant or ensure that no sale occurred without the remaindermen’s consent.
In short, it seems that the missing ingredient in the way that
courts approach these issues is an understanding of how different
legal rules may affect the Coasean bargains that could be struck
when vulnerable senior citizens are one party to the transaction. A
first-best approach to these kinds of disputes would allow life tenants to make a clean break through a partition-like cause of action
similar to what we see in co-ownership disputes. In the absence of
such doctrinal innovation, a legal standard that imposes on the life
tenant a personalized obligation to use her financial and physical
resources to maintain the property as best she can—no less, and
importantly, no more—seems likely to result in bargains that reflect
the high regard that the party that created the life tenancy (a
testator, typically, often the life tenant’s spouse) had for the life
209. A Kaldor-Hicks improvement is a change in the allocation of resources that benefits
those who gain from the change more than it harms those who lose as a result of it. Jonathan
Law, Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency, in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING (6th ed.
2018).
210. See, e.g., Belt v. Simkins, 39 S.E. 430, 431 (Ga. 1901); Stevens v. Rose, 37 N.W. 205,
209-10 (Mich. 1888).

2021]

PROPERTY LAW FOR THE AGES

605

tenant. Short of that, it seems like the best rationale for the harsher
rulings we see in some courts is to serve as a kind of penalty default
rule that steers testators away from life tenancies and towards more
flexible arrangements such as trusts.211
We want to address that penalty default argument head-on,
because it is a common but pernicious response to our proposal.
Essentially, the argument runs that many of the problems we describe above could have been avoided had the lawyers chosen to use
a trust instead of a life estate, so the law of waste does not need to
change. To be clear, the first part of the argument is correct. A welldesigned trust would allow the use of the land held in trust to more
closely resemble the use that a fee simple owner would prefer. Of
course, trusts introduce problems of their own, such as the need to
pay a trustee and the danger that the trustee will engage in unlawful self-dealing. But given the problems that waste can create
for life tenants in possession, this is a step we would advise clients
to take.
At the same time, lots of clients evidently are not getting that
advice from their lawyers, who continue to employ life estates to
deal with a problem that often could be solved better via trusts. For
these clients, scholars’ Monday morning quarterbacking is unlikely
to be of much comfort.212 If many people are opting for life estates,
contrary to the advice of some (but not all) sophisticated trusts and
estates counsel, and if the United States is not going to follow the
British model of abolishing legal life estates altogether,213 it is hard
to justify giving people a package of rights and responsibilities that
virtually no testator or grantor would want and that no life tenant
would prefer. The kinds of people who wind up creating problematic
life estates that disadvantage their surviving spouses often (a) will
not have access to the highest quality counsel or the means to afford
them, and (b) will be dead by the time the problems become evident.
Rather, when a life estate is employed, a majoritarian “what would
211. Cf. Barros, supra note 188, at 36-37 (discussing the merits of abolishing the legal life
estate and replacing it with an equitable life estate in trust, as England has done).
212. As an alternative to reforming the rules governing waste, the law could subsidize trust
administration or the provision of high-quality estate planning lawyers for middle- and lowerincome seniors.
213. See Scott Andrew Shepard, Which the Deader Hand? A Counter to the American Law
Institute’s Proposed Revival of Dying Perpetuities Rules, 86 TUL. L. REV. 559, 619 (2012).
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most people want” understanding of that arrangement still makes
sense, and that is going to be one that provides for greater flexibility
than is available under present law. Absent some clear story about
how anybody’s intentions are consistent with the way life estates
are typically constrained today, the continued insistence that the
possessory heirs of people who were not savvy enough to create
trusts suffer is at the very least regressive.
III. PROTECTION FOR ELDERLY RENTERS
The two Parts that follow share two characteristics. First, in both
settings, the high relocation costs faced by older people and their
relatively inelastic incomes drive much of the analysis. Second, both
settings involve the challenges of communal living arrangements
where multiple parties have strong interests in who resides in a
community and how it is governed. To begin, we turn our eyes to
renters of residential housing and the extent to which the law helps
ensure that their housing is safe and habitable.
At common law, leases were understood as conveyances of interests in land that were controlled by the doctrine of caveat lessee:
the tenant took possession of the premises in whatever condition
they happened to be.214 It was only in the 1970s that state courts
and legislatures began to recognize an implied warranty of habitability in every residential lease.215 These warranties make uninhabitable or dangerous conditions that are not remedied by the
landlord breaches of the lease contract that, in turn, free tenants of
their obligations under that agreement—including the obligation to
pay rent.216 But the bar for a landlord is low: renters are entitled
only to a minimum level of safe and healthy housing.217 And, most
214. See, e.g., Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 206-07 (Vt. 1984) (explaining history of
caveat lessee).
215. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (Haw. 1969); cf. Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 251 A.2d
268, 273 (N.J. 1969) (finding an implied warranty against latent defects in commercial leases).
216. See, e.g., Bos. Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 842 (Mass. 1973); see also
David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
389, 441-42 (2011).
217. See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT (URLTA) § 2.104 (NAT’L CONF. OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LS. 1972); Jana-Ault Phillips & Carol J. Miller, The Implied
Warranty of Habitability: Is Rent Escrow the Solution or the Obstacle to Tenant’s
Enforcement?, 25 CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 1, 9 (2018) (counting nineteen states
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important for our purposes, alleged violations of the warranty are
evaluated based on “the nature of the deficiency or defect[;] its effect
on the life, health or safety of the tenant[; the] length of time it has
persisted[;] and the age of the structure.”218
Notably, the doctrine tends to consider neither a particular
tenant’s needs nor expectations. Rather, it generally speaks to what
a “reasonable person” would consider to be necessary or fit for
habitation.219 This results in troubling outcomes in cases involving
tenants with disabilities; a landlord’s failure to provide a quadriplegic tenant with a “‘roll-in’ shower” that allows for wheelchair access
has been held not to constitute a breach of the warranty of habitability—even in an apartment billed as a “handicapped” unit—because such an amenity is not one that is expected “in the eyes of a
reasonable person.”220 As we will see, the doctrine also results in
troubling outcomes for older tenants.
Existing law strikes the balance it does, however, in part because
improving the quality of residential conditions necessarily comes
at a cost. Landlords who initially bear that cost—in the form of
construction, repairs, hiring additional maintenance staff, et cetera—will naturally be expected to pass some of those costs on to
tenants in the form of higher rents.221 This, in turn, risks pricing out

to have adopted the URLTA); Donald E. Campbell, Forty (Plus) Years After the Revolution:
Observations on the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 793,
807-08 (2013) (discussing content of URLTA).
218. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); accord Glasoe v. Trinkle,
479 N.E.2d 915, 920 (Ill. 1985); 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 717 (2021).
219. Solow v. Wellner, 658 N.E.2d 1005, 1008 (N.Y. 1995); see, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 92.052(a)(3)(A) (West 2021) (referring to conditions that “materially affect[ ] the physical
health or safety of an ordinary tenant” (emphasis added)); Chiodini v. Fox, 207 S.W.3d 174,
176 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (“Habitability is measured by community standards, generally
reflected in local housing and property maintenance codes.” (citing Detling v. Edelbrock, 671
S.W.2d 265, 270 (Mo. 1984))); Fitzpatrick v. ACF Props. Grp., Inc., 595 N.E.2d 1327, 1342 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992) (“The condition complained of must be such as to truly render the premises
uninhabitable in the eyes of a reasonable person.” (citing Glasoe, 479 N.E.2d at 920));
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 142, at 540 (“Generally speaking, an ‘adequate standard of
habitability’ has to be met, and a breach occurs when the leased premises are ‘uninhabitable’
in the eyes of a reasonable person.”); Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 7, at 1447 (“American
law has largely stuck with a one-size-fits-all approach to the implied warranty of
habitability.”).
220. Port Chester Hous. Auth. v. Mobley, 789 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799-800 (App. Div. 2004).
221. See, e.g., Chi. Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 741-42 (7th Cir.
1987) (Posner, J., concurring); Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the
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of the market and denying housing of any quality to the same underprivileged tenants that the law aims to help.222 For some, this is
a reason to be skeptical of most tenant protection laws,223 but one
need not go that far. That is, one might well conclude that some
floor is necessary regardless of the costs it imposes—that even if
poor tenants “want” to rent an apartment covered in mold and
infested with rats because it is the only apartment they can afford,
the government ought to intervene to prevent them from doing so
(and, hopefully, to assist them in affording a suitable residence). But
the higher the bar set by the law, the greater the costs, so it behooves society at large to delimit the reach of the warranty of
habitability.224 After all, at some point, the costs of achieving a high
standard might be so great that the rental market will not bear
them, causing the landlord to cut his losses by ceasing the renting
of the property altogether, either by letting it deteriorate or converting it to condominiums that are not subject to the implied
warranty.225 That loss of housing supply, if replicated sufficiently
across a city, could in turn drive up the price of the remaining rental
housing.226
We, too, are disinclined to suggest that law ought to forbid all but
the ideal residential housing conditions. Nor do we suggest that
every tenant’s idiosyncratic definition of “habitable” carry the coercive force of the warranty of habitability. In theory, once minimum standards are set such that no one faces unsafe housing, the
market ought to be capable of doing the rest. People who want “better” housing, or housing that fits their individual preferences, can
seek it out and decide for themselves how much they are willing to
pay for particular amenities. And if enough people want those
American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L. REV. 879, 890-91 (1975); Campbell, supra note 217, at
808-09.
222. See Chi. Bd. of Realtors, 819 F.2d at 741-42 (Posner, J., concurring); Meyers, supra
note 221, at 903.
223. See Chi. Bd. of Realtors, 819 F.2d at 741-42 (Posner, J., concurring) (criticizing on
these grounds a Chicago ordinance that granted tenants a suite of rights against landlords).
But see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “Don’t Try this at Home”: Posner as Political Economist, 74
U. CHI. L. REV. 1873, 1875-83 (2007) (pointing out that many of Posner’s arguments against
the implied warranty in Chicago Board of Realtors are inconsistent with both economic theory
and the empirical literature).
224. See Chi. Bd. of Realtors, 819 F.2d at 741 (Posner, J., concurring).
225. See Meyers, supra note 221, at 889; Super, supra note 216, at 422.
226. See Chi. Bd. of Realtors, 819 F.2d at 741 (Posner, J., concurring).
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features, they will vote with their feet and their wallets, and landlords will compete to attract those tenants by offering those features.227
But foot- and wallet-voting assume sufficient mobility and resources.228 The more stuck people are, the more they are at the
mercy of their current rental conditions—and, consequently, the
more they might be said to be in need of amplified legal protection
from those conditions.229 One quite obviously “stuck” renter constituency is poor renters of all ages.230 They lack the resources to pay
more for higher quality, so landlords in turn make little effort to
entice them with high-quality features.231 This reality acutely harms
Black, Native American, and Hispanic households, which are significantly more likely than white households to be low-income
renters.232 These are reasons why, as just noted, the floor provided
by the warranty of habitability is important.233 But while there
might be good reasons to raise that floor, one must be careful of the
dangers discussed above that could attend a warranty that is too
strong. To remedy the inability of poor renters to engage in walletvoting, the superior solution is therefore to fatten their wallets—
227. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 21-24 (1970) (discussing the
ways in which exit disciplines organizations and prompts firms to improve quality).
228. Our focus is on differences in mobility among renters, but we recognize that renters
as a group do tend to be more mobile than homeowners because they lack a financial investment in the residence and need not worry about possibly selling at a loss, nor need they contend with the time and expense of a real estate transaction. See Michael C. Pollack, Land Use
Federalism’s False Choice, 68 ALA. L. REV. 707, 715-16 (2017); Fennell, supra note 53, at 626;
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 75 (2001); Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten
Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local Land Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464, 487
(2000); Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1126 (1996); Richard
A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 154-58 (1992); Ilya
Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 53, 58-59 (2011).
229. Cf. David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127
YALE L.J. 78, 84 (2017).
230. Cf. id. at 117.
231. Cf. Emily Badger, A Luxury Apartment Rises in a Poor Neighborhood. What Happens
Next?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14/upshot/luxuryapartments-poor-neighborhoods.html [https://perma.cc/TD72-SUU3].
232. THE GAP: A SHORTAGE OF AFFORDABLE HOMES, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL. 13-15,
https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY7GKJ2Y].
233. Of course, as David Super has noted, even with the warranty of habitability, tenants
in a tight housing market “may feel they dare not assert the warranty because the likelihood
they will end up somewhere worse is high.” Super, supra note 216, at 409.
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that is, to provide housing vouchers, cash transfers, or other social
supports that increase incomes and/or make rents more affordable.234
Older tenants are often stuck for a different or additional reason.
Even if they have the resources to vote with their wallets—and
racial disparities coupled with relatively inelastic incomes suggest
that may frequently not be the case for many235—they might be
insufficiently mobile to effectively vote with their feet when rental
housing quality is inadequate. For one thing, as discussed above, it
is simply the case that elderly people do move less frequently than
younger people.236 But more to the point, the dynamics of aging, the
importance of being able to age in place, and the heightened relocation costs all discussed above speak to at least some of the reasons why simply relocating is often not a realistic option.237
Because older tenants tend to be less mobile than others, they are
especially vulnerable to their housing conditions. And the sorts of
fiscal solutions that make sense when it comes to vulnerable poor
tenants do not address the source of this vulnerability. For that reason, as advocates seek to improve and safeguard tenants’ rights, it
is crucial to bear in mind the distinct vulnerabilities and needs of
many elderly tenants.238 One option that ought to at least be on the
table in that effort is considering whether the warranty of habitability should provide more tailored protection to older tenants by
accounting for the age of the tenant, and not merely the age of the
building, when determining what conditions render a residence
uninhabitable or unsafe.239
As with our discussion of takings compensation, however, we do
not have in mind a shift towards total subjectivity or an unstructured thumb on the scale when the tenant is above a certain age.240
234. See, e.g., id. 461 (“[D]irect subsidies have far more potential than regulatory action to
improve low-income tenants’ housing conditions.”); Sara Pratt, Civil Rights Strategies to
Increase Mobility, 127 YALE L.J.F. 498, 512-14 (2017); Andrea J. Boyack, Equitably Housing
(Almost) Half a Nation of Renters, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 109, 132-33 (2017).
235. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 25-40 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019, S. 6458, 2019-20 Leg.,
242d Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
239. Cf. supra note 222 and accompanying text.
240. In any event, implementing the current standard of habitability is hardly an objective
task given that it is already “largely socially constructed” by judges who “view the question
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Rather, our discussion pivots off a second observation: in addition
to being relatively immobile, older tenants also are likely to—as a
cohort—have predictable needs in the housing in which they are
stuck and to be less able to make repairs or adjustments necessary
to meet those needs on their own.241
Americans age sixty-five and over are more than three times
more likely to have a disability than Americans under the age of
sixty-five.242 So, for example, owing to reduced mobility, older people
might need stair-lifts, ramps, or other devices to be able to even
access and fully live in their residences.243 Due to decreased balance
and increased risk of serious adverse consequences from a fall, they
might need features like grab bars in showers and raised toilet
seats—without which a shower and a toilet might be said to not be
safely operable.244 Losses of dexterity might call for lever-style
of ‘habitability’ through their own cultural lens.” Campbell, supra note 217, at 810.
Unsatisfactory conditions exist on a continuum ranging from grossly uninhabitable to merely
inconvenient, and courts inevitably “must make decisions about where along this continuum
to place a particular complaint.” Id. at 811.
241. See JCHS REPORT, supra note 16, at 67 (“Renters are more likely to have mobility
disabilities than owners but have less control over modifying their units.”); James, supra note
22, at 434 (observing that, while “[m]any jurisdictions allow tenants the right to make repairs
to the unit and deduct these costs from future rent payments”—a reference to the warranty
of habitability—“such rights may be more problematic to exercise for elderly residents who
may be unable to complete or oversee such repairs”); cf. Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 207
(Vt. 1984) (concluding that the warranty of habitability is necessary because, among other
things, “today’s residential tenant ... is not experienced in performing maintenance work on
urban, complex living units”).
242. See Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: 2019 ACS 5-Year Estimates
Data Profiles, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?d=ACS%205-Year%
20Estimates%20Data%20Profiles&tid=ACSDP5Y2019.DP02 [https://perma.cc/Z8QJ-P8WC]
(indicating that 34.5 percent of Americans age sixty-five and over have a disability compared
to 10.3 percent of Americans age eighteen to sixty-four and 4.2 percent of Americans under
the age of eighteen).
243. See JCHS REPORT, supra note 16, at 67; ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAND USE LAW AND
DISABILITY: PLANNING AND ZONING FOR ACCESSIBLE COMMUNITIES 22 (2015) (noting that
people over age sixty-five “have much higher rates of low functional mobility than the general
population, with as many as 40 to 50 percent ... having some type of limited mobility”); cf.
Rodriguez v. Providence Hous. Auth., 824 A.2d 452, 453-54 (R.I. 2003) (tenant who was
ninety-five years old fell down the stairs in his apartment and died, but landlord was not
liable even though tenant had requested a single-story apartment because landlord “did all
that it reasonably could” by placing him on a waiting list for such an apartment).
244. See JCHS REPORT, supra note 16, at 36, 67; MALLOY, supra note 243, at 215 (“[F]alls
are the leading cause of accidental death for the elderly, accounting for about half of all accidental deaths in the home.”); Important Facts About Falls, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/HomeandRecreationalsafety/falls/adultfalls.html [https://
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faucets and handles—and surely doors and sinks that cannot be
safely operated at least raise a serious question of habitability.245
And given the increased need for a walker or wheelchair, they might
require step-free entryways and hallways, doors, and parking spaces
wide enough to accommodate those assistance tools.246 Housing that
meets these needs is critical for the health and independence of
older people.247 While this is all true for both elderly owners and
renters alike, both of whom are more likely to have these needs than
younger owners and renters,248 older renters are more likely to
require assistance than older homeowners.249
Our suggestion is therefore that the warranty of habitability
might recognize that some conditions that would not render a residence uninhabitable or unsafe in the mind of the so-called reasonable tenant—like the lack of the features just discussed— might
well do so for an older tenant.250 Considering these to be optional
luxuries just because the “average” tenant would not need them or
consider them necessary for residential safety overlooks both the
relative vulnerability and immobility of elderly tenants and the
predictable, nonidiosyncratic nature of those individuals’ needs.
perma.cc/F29X-H8VL] (observing a 30 percent increase in the rate of death for older adults
from falls from 2007 to 2016 and recommending grab bars in bathrooms); cf. Nepveu v. Rau,
583 A.2d 1273, 1273-74 (Vt. 1990) (holding that unusable bathroom constitutes breach of
warranty of habitability).
245. See JCHS REPORT, supra note 16, at 9.
246. Housing for Seniors: Challenges and Solutions, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/summer17/highlight1.html [https://perma.cc/
CS4H-TZU4]; cf. Phillips & Miller, supra note 217, at 29 (“Finding an accessible unit for someone with physical disabilities, such as accommodating a large wheelchair, can take up to six
months.”).
247. It is also important for their mental health and well-being. See Evans et al., supra
note 23, at 381-82 (finding that “housing quality,” including “support for mobility impairment”
among other things, “is significantly related to positive affect” among elderly people).
248. See JCHS REPORT, supra note 16, at 38 (explaining that “the prevalence of disability
rises sharply with advancing age” and finding that 41 percent of adults age sixty-five to
seventy-nine and 71 percent of adults over eighty “have at least one self-care, household
activity, or mobility disability”).
249. See id. at 39 (emphasizing that “renter households aged 65 and older are far more
likely than owner households of the same age to have a disability, though the gap narrows at
more advanced ages”); id. at 47 (“Renter households will account for 24 percent of overall
growth in households 65 and over through 2025, and for 26 percent of overall growth from
2025 to 2035. However, in each decade, renters will drive at least 30 percent of growth in the
number of older households with [disabilities].”).
250. Cf. Campbell, supra note 217, at 810 (suggesting that, because “the concept of
habitability is largely socially constructed,” it “perhaps should evolve” with experience).

2021]

PROPERTY LAW FOR THE AGES

613

The former social facts justify the added protection while the latter
minimize the damage done to the doctrine, the risk of unpredictability for landlords, and the burden on courts’ dockets.251
In states with common law warranties, courts could quite easily
shift the doctrine in this area by considering older tenants’ allegations from this perspective.252 In states with statutory warranties,
legislatures could itemize the features that are required for habitability in the case of an older tenant (just like legislatures already
itemize the features generally required for habitability).253 Whatever
the form, these interventions would better account for the unique
situation in which elderly renters find themselves.
A few important objections warrant responses. First, to be sure,
like any expansion of tenant protection laws, these interventions
will increase the cost of rental housing on the margin, with the
perverse outcome that older renters might be less able to afford
housing at all.254 As discussed above, this concern must be taken
seriously. But it also must not be overstated lest it be wielded to the
detriment of people’s health and welfare. Many of these amenities—
grab bars and lever-style handles, for example—are relatively lowcost to begin with, and landlords can effectively spread these low
costs across tenants and time such that they occasion little to no
perceptible rent increase.255
Second, one might worry that landlords will discriminate against
older renters in order to avoid these obligations and costs. This concern about landlord behavior is, again, liable to being overstated if
251. And, as discussed above, the fact that everyone can expect to get both the short and
long end of the stick throughout their lives mitigates any perceived unfairness at any
particular point in the life cycle. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
252. State courts could also interpret language in statutory warranties in ways that
consider the unique circumstances of elderly tenants. For example, Delaware’s warranty
states that landlords must “[p]rovide a rental unit which shall not endanger the health,
welfare or safety of the tenants.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5305(a)(2) (2021). At least one
Washington court has held that a breach exists when conditions “pose an actual or potential
safety hazard to [the residence’s] occupants.” Lian v. Stalick, 25 P.3d 467, 472 (Wash. Ct. App.
2001) (citing Atherton Condo. Apartment-Owners Ass’n Bd. v. Blume Dev. Co., 799 P.2d 250,
259-60 (1990)). And, as shown here, certain features—or lack thereof—are more likely to
endanger the health, welfare, or safety of elderly tenants than that of younger ones. Id.
253. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
255. See Strahilevitz, supra note 223, at 1875-76 (pointing out that the empirical literature
has found little evidence that expanded habitability laws have significant effects on housing
markets).

614

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:561

landlords can spread the cost and recoup the expense. But putting
that to the side, landlords in many jurisdictions are already prohibited from engaging in this sort of discrimination. While the
federal Fair Housing Act does not prohibit landlord discrimination
on the basis of age,256 many state and local laws do so.257 Indeed, the
foregoing discussion of the vulnerability of older renters militates in
favor of more states and localities enacting similar protections,
perhaps alongside a more tailored warranty of habitability.
Third, many scholars believe the warranty of habitability is not
up to the task of protecting tenants.258 For example, in her recent
study of New York City, Nicole Summers found that less than 2
percent of tenants facing eviction for nonpayment of rent were found
in housing court to have been entitled by the warranty of habitability to abate their rent payments.259 Even when looking only at cases
in which landlords permitted housing code violations to persist,
tenants prevailed on their assertion of the warranty of habitability
just 9 percent of the time.260 In short, according to Summers, “[t]he
warranty of habitability did not provide any benefit at all to
approximately 91 to 97 percent of tenants who appeared to satisfy
the elements of the claim.”261 Tenants’ lack of representation and
sophistication, especially when compared to landlords’ repeat-player
status, only exacerbates the power imbalance,262 though Summers’s
256. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2021).
257. See, e.g., AUSTIN, TEX., CODE § 5-1-51; 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-103(Q), 5/3-102 (2021);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(5)(a) (McKinney 2021); 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955(h)
(West 2021); WIS. STAT. § 106.50(1m)(h), (2) (2021).
258. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 217, at 32; Nicole Summers, The Limits of Good Law:
A Study of Outcomes in Housing Court, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 145, 167-73 (2020) (reviewing
literature). But see Paula A. Franzese, Abbott Gorin & David J. Guzik, The Implied Warranty
of Habitability Lives: Making Real the Promise of Landlord-Tenant Reform, 69 RUTGERS U.
L. REV. 1, 5 (2016) (presenting results of small study suggesting that the warranty “can
function to bring needed repair and improvement to otherwise substandard dwellings”
because, “[i]n more than half of the cases surveyed,” landlords remediated housing code
violations).
259. Summers, supra note 258, at 190.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 199.
262. See id. at 171 (observing that “scholars claim that the ineffectiveness is a function of
tenants’ lack of access to counsel”); Phillips & Miller, supra note 217, at 32; Super, supra note
216, at 414-16; Franzese et al., supra note 258, at 6. A number of scholars also blame the
ineffectiveness on the obligation in many states that tenants pay their withheld rent into
escrow. See Super, supra note 216, at 433. But see Phillips & Miller, supra note 217, at 36
(approving of rent escrow).
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findings suggest that these factors only explain some of the “operationalization gap.”263 If all of this is true, it is fair to ask whether
a warranty of habitability that took account of older renters’ needs
would in fact do much at all to protect those needs.
We think it could, but even if it would not, the reality of older
tenants’ disparate vulnerability is itself an important and underappreciated facet of the scholarly and policy conversation around
the warranty of habitability. First, though, we present our tentative
case for optimism. Summers’s study only examines cases in which
landlords evicted tenants for nonpayment of rent and tenants invoked the warranty of habitability as a defense.264 Those results
therefore do not account for any tenants’ successful invocation of the
warranty out of court, either as bargaining leverage to secure landlord compliance or reduced rent, or as a basis for making repairs
themselves and deducting the cost from their rent payments.265 The
results also do not account for any ex ante effect of the warranty.
That is, Summers’s data do not reveal how many more residences
would be uninhabitable but for the existence of the warranty having
shaped landlord behavior and tenant expectations. Empowering
older tenants and embedding their needs in the law along the lines
we lay out here could better enable them to seek necessary improvements out of court and could help foster a rental market more
receptive to those needs.
Second, Summers’s dataset reveals that tenants, in fact, win
judicial orders compelling landlords to make necessary repairs in
over half of the cases.266 This suggests that the warranty is actually
a meaningful source of rights. In turn, then, a warranty that better
fits the needs of elderly tenants ought to likewise be a meaningful
source of rights for them. The problem is that those same courts
appear to fail to stand behind their own orders in the majority of
those cases.267 That, however, is not a failing of the warranty of

263. Summers, supra note 258, at 205-10.
264. Id. at 149, 182-83.
265. Cf. Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 210 (Vt. 1984) (“[W]hen the landlord is notified
of the defect but fails to repair it within a reasonable amount of time, and the tenant
subsequently repairs the defect, the tenant may deduct the expense of the repair from future
rent.”).
266. Summers, supra note 258, at 199.
267. See id. at 201.
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habitability, but of the institutions charged with enforcing it.268
Fixing those institutions is critical too, of course, but their flaws
should obscure neither the need for a better-crafted underlying law
nor the potential of such a law in the hands of more faithful
stewards.
But even if our cautious optimism about the potential for a more
tailored warranty to protect older renters was misplaced, the fact
remains that the existing warranty—as inadequate as it might be
in general—is an especially poor fit for those older renters. It is,
therefore, critical that any reform project aimed at addressing the
shortcomings Summers and others have exposed with respect to
the warranty of habitability take account of the distinct vulnerabilities and needs of older renters, whether that means rethinking the
doctrine, addressing shortcomings in enforcement, or enacting entirely new sorts of tenant protections.
Indeed, existing law reforms have not adequately filled this
niche. Perhaps the most well-known that might come to mind are
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)269 and its forerunner,
the Rehabilitation Act.270 These federal laws have done much to
improve access and safety for people with mobility obstacles and
other disabilities—including, but certainly not limited to, older
people— and to spur innovation in the methods by which those
obstacles can be reduced.271 But these laws do next to nothing with
respect to tenants in private housing. The Rehabilitation Act only
regulates recipients of federal funds,272 and the ADA only applies
to public employers above a certain size,273 public entities,274 and
public accommodations such as stores and hotels.275
The federal Fair Housing Act (FHA), as a result of a suite of
amendments in 1988, also generally makes unlawful discrimination against tenants with disabilities.276 But the statute does not
268. Cf. id. at 217 (suggesting such an explanation).
269. 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
270. 29 U.S.C. § 791.
271. See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco, Disability and Design, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 952, 9851002 (2020).
272. See 29 U.S.C. § 794; Buccafusco, supra note 271, at 993.
273. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5).
274. Id. § 12131(1).
275. Id. § 12182(a).
276. Id. § 3604(f)(1)-(2).
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affirmatively require many landlords to make premises safe for
tenants with disabilities.277 Rather, it requires landlords to allow
tenants at their own expense to modify premises to suit their
needs.278 And it provides that landlords may condition that permission on the tenant restoring the premises to their earlier condition, again at the tenant’s expense.279 The most the FHA does is
recognize the importance of some of the features like the ones we
have highlighted above, as it requires multifamily dwellings with
four or more units constructed after 1988 to be built with wheelchair-accessible entryways, hallways, and kitchens, as well as “reinforcements in bathroom walls to allow later installation of grab
bars”—though not grab bars themselves.280 This is no doubt important, but it is also of no help to tenants in older buildings, in
smaller buildings, or in need of more than these specific structural
features.281
In fact, the shortcomings of the FHA and the ADA illuminate yet
another reason why law should better guarantee the quality of
housing for older renters. These protections offered by the FHA and
the ADA for tenants with disabilities operate ex post.282 That is,
suppose an elderly renter who is not disabled falls in the shower
because of the absence of a grab bar, and this fall causes a brain
hemorrhage or a skeletal injury that renders the tenant disabled.
At this point, and only at this point, does the protection of these
laws materialize.283 But it would be far better for tenants and for
society if the law helped reduce the ex ante likelihood of tenants
becoming disabled because of dangers in their homes. Focusing on
the needs of relatively medically frail but not legally disabled
elderly tenants is a sensible way to achieve this goal. That is what
we are advocating for here—recognizing the fact that older renters
are at heightened risk of becoming disabled in their homes and in
turn providing more robust protections for these vulnerable Americans who fall into the gaps of existing legal protections.
277. See id. § 3604(f)(1)-(3).
278. Id. § 3604(f)(3)(A).
279. Id.
280. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C), (f)(7).
281. See JCHS REPORT, supra note 16, at 30 (similarly observing that the FHA and ADA
“stop short of ensuring that the interiors of all units are fully accessible”).
282. Cf. id.
283. Cf. id.
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Last, though some jurisdictions have made efforts to provide older
tenants with greater rights against their landlords, we are aware of
none—legislatures and courts alike—that have implemented anything like the proposal we offer here.284 For example, New Jersey
has granted to elderly tenants a “protected tenancy status” that
applies when rental housing is converted into condominiums or
cooperatives.285 This status entitles older tenants to “remain as a
tenant in a converted unit for up to forty years beyond any period
already authorized” by generally applicable laws.286 It also regulates
rents during the protected tenancy period. This statutory protection
appropriately recognizes the unique dislocation costs for older
tenants,287 but it fails to recognize that protection in occupancy
alone is a half-measure when the conditions are of such inadequate
and unsafe quality that they are not properly suited for an elderly
tenant’s living needs.288 Our aim here is to open property law’s eyes
to the latter problem and to begin to offer some solutions.
As we move to Part IV, we will stay with the topic of communal
living and identify some important similarities between tenants and
owners.
IV. NAHRSTEDT REVISITED—PETS AS MEDICAL DEVICES
Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass’n is one of the
jewels of the 1L Property course.289 It pitted a condominium owner
against her neighbors in a heated battle over whether she could
keep her strictly indoor cats while she lived in a complex that had
284. See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text (discussing status of warranty of
habitability across the country). As discussed above, the URLTA does not account for the age
of the tenant. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. Even those states with more
detailed warranties do not do so. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941.1 (2021); MD. CODE ANN.,
REAL PROP., §§ 8-211, 8-211.1 (2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42 (2021). The closest any states
seem to come to considering the age of the tenant is with respect to children in the context of
lead-based paint. See, e.g., Benik v. Hatcher, 750 A.2d 10, 12, 20 (Md. 2000).
285. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1(k), -61.25, -61.31 (West 2021).
286. Troy Ltd. v. Renna, 727 F.2d 287, 289-92 (3d Cir. 1984) (describing state tenancy laws
and holding that these provisions do not violate the Contracts and Takings Clauses of the U.S.
Constitution); see Manheim, supra note 106, at 977 (discussing other “eviction protection
laws” that afford “elderly tenants ... added protection”).
287. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.23 (2021) (making such findings).
288. See id.
289. See 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994).
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a no-pets policy.290 One reason the case is fun to teach is because
pets have enriched the lives of so many law students, and the
affection that typical law students in their twenties or thirties
express for their companion animals contributes color and levity to
class discussion of key doctrines.291 Yet, there is another angle to be
considered with Nahrstedt. For so many elderly Americans, the
presence or absence of a pet in their homes becomes not just a
question of joy and companionship, but plausibly a matter of life and
death.292
In 1988, Natore Nahrstedt and her three beloved cats moved into
a condominium complex whose covenants, conditions, and restrictions prohibited companion animals.293 Upon discovering the
presence of the cats, the condominium association demanded their
removal and began fining Nahrstedt when she refused to comply.294 She sued, alleging that the restrictions were unlawful as
applied to her felines, which were strictly indoor cats.295 The California Supreme Court held that it would enforce the pet restrictions—and other such condominium restrictions—unless they were
“wholly arbitrary, violate[d] a fundamental public policy, or impose[d] a burden on the use of affected land that far outweigh[ed]
any benefit.”296 In applying this test, the courts were to focus not
on Nahrstedt’s well-behaved cats that seemed to create no negative
externalities, but on companion animals in general.297 Thus, it
would not be enough for Nahrstedt, or another owner, to show that
her felines enriched her life while imposing no costs on the neighbors.298 As long as a pet restriction in general was not irrational, the
association could do what it liked and embrace a bright-line prohibition.299 This legal standard encompasses nearly total deference

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. at 1278-79.
Cf. id. at 1278.
Cf. id. at 1295 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1278 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1287.
Id. at 1290.
Id.
Id. at 1278.
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to the decisions of condominium associations to restrict how individual owners can use their property.300
The majority’s opinion sparked a pained dissent from Justice
Arabian, who accused the majority’s handiwork of reflecting “a narrow, indeed chary, view of the law that eschews the human spirit in
favor of arbitrary efficiency” in a way that “contributes to the fraying of our social fabric.”301 Arabian extended his criticisms in a law
review article published a year later, in which he proposed model
legislation to overrule the majority opinion.302 Arabian would have
prohibited the enforcement of a rights restriction against a condominium owner in the absence of a reasonable economic, health,
safety, or aesthetic justification, and he would have entitled the
individual owner to prevail if the restriction was not justified as
applied to the owner’s particular circumstances.303
Ultimately, the California legislature came to agree with Justice
Arabian, by and large. The state enacted a new law that prohibits
associations from banning owners from keeping at least one pet in
a common interest community, exotic pets aside.304 But the legislature did not enact Arabian’s proposed legislation, which would have
sided with the individual rather than the association with respect
to any condominium rule that restricted the owner’s rights.305 In
other words, the legislature kept in place Nahrstedt’s rule of broad
deference to homeowners’ associations’ decisions while constraining
their ability to keep residents from living with a pet.306

300. The California Supreme Court subsequently turbo-charged Nahrstedt. Whereas
Nahrstedt itself seemed to limit the high level of judicial deference to covenants that were
imposed at the time of the common interest community’s formation, Villa de las Palmas
Homeowners Ass’n v. Terifaj, 90 P.3d 1223, 1234-35 (Cal. 2004), held that Nahrstedt deference
also applied to new restrictions that were approved by a majority of a homeowners’ association board. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 142, at 888.
301. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1292-93 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
302. See Armand Arabian, Condos, Cats, & CC&Rs: Invasion of the Castle Common, 23
PEPP. L. REV. 1, 24-29 (1995).
303. Id. at 29.
304. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4715 (West 2021). The law applies to domesticated birds, cats, dogs,
and aquatic animals kept in aquariums. Id.
305. Cf. id.
306. For an illuminating discussion of why legislatures generally tend to overrule common
interest communities narrowly, rather than broadly, see Ryan McCarl, When Homeowners
Associations Go Too Far: Political Responses to Unpopular Rules in Common Interest Communities, 43 REAL EST. L.J. 453, 455-56 (2015).
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We too wish to focus on the particular rather than the general
and ask whether the stakes for elderly people are sufficiently high
to warrant similar moves in other states to provide older homeowners with special rights to challenge pet prohibitions. Natore Nahrstedt herself was not a senior citizen at the time of the litigation
that bears her name.307 Having said that, Justice Arabian flagged in
his dissent the especially important companionship a pet can offer
to an older person,308 and the scientific literature suggests that the
physical health benefits of pet ownership may indeed be significant,
especially when it comes to heart diseases that are the leading
cause of death among elderly people.309 The evidence supporting
the mental health benefits of pet ownership is a little more mixed
by comparison, but the weight of the evidence also suggests these
benefits are significant, especially during times of stress.310 In light
of these health considerations, depriving older people of the opportunity to live with companion animals—or forcing them to move
to keep a pet and incur dislocation costs systematically more
significant than those faced by younger people311—could present
costs that render the rules violative of public policy.312
Before diving into the medical literature on older people and the
health effects of interactions with companion animals, it is important to identify the gaps that exist in the medical literature. There
are hundreds of papers studying the health implications of pet
ownership, but the vast majority of them suffer from selection effect
problems.313 Namely, pet owners and nonowners may be different in
various other respects, so interactions with companion animals
307. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 142, at 886.
308. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1295 (Cal. 1994) (Arabian,
J., dissenting).
309. See Glenn N. Levine, Karen Allen, Lynne T. Braun, Hayley E. Christian, Erika
Friedmann, Kathryn A. Taubert, Sue Ann Thomas, Deborah L. Wells & Richard A. Lange, Pet
Ownership and Cardiovascular Risk: A Scientific Statement from the American Heart
Association, 127 CIRCULATION 2353, 2356 (2013).
310. See Sandy M. Branson, Lisa Boss, Stanley Cron & Dennis C. Turner, Depression,
Loneliness, and Pet Attachment in Homebound Older Adult Cat and Dog Owners, 4 J. MIND
& MED. SCIS. 38, 40 (2017).
311. See supra notes 16-40 and accompanying text.
312. See Rebecca J. Huss, Re-Evaluating the Role of Companion Animals in the Era of the
Aging Boomer, 47 AKRON L. REV. 497, 498 (2014).
313. See Harold Herzog, The Impact of Pets on Human Health and Psychological WellBeing: Fact, Fiction, or Hypothesis?, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 236, 238 (2011).
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may not explain observed differences in the health of owners and
nonowners.314 Studies that randomly assign companion animals to
people, which removes the selection effect problem, are rare for
understandable reasons.315 We will summarize this research first
and then examine what courts might learn from observational
studies.
The two randomized controlled studies we have located of companion animals with elderly populations showed significant health
benefits from interactions with dogs, though they had sample sizes
and limited designs that should make us take their conclusions with
a grain of salt. First, Carl Harper and his coauthors used a randomized controlled trial to study the effects of three fifteen-minute visits
with therapy dogs during physical therapy sessions that followed
surgery on arthritic joints.316 This experiment with seventy-two
subjects randomly assigned to a treatment or control group found a
highly significant and beneficial effect on post-operative pain in the
treatment group compared to the control group.317 Second, Caterina
Ambrosi and her coauthors studied the effects of providing older
people with prolonged exposure to pet dogs over the course of ten
weeks during weekly thirty-minute sessions.318 This randomized
study found that exposure to dogs significantly reduced clinical
depression among a sample of elderly patients in a long-term care
facility.319 There was some evidence that the presence of the dogs
improved the patients’ moods and enhanced their interactivity,320
314. Jessica Saunders, Layla Parast, Susan H. Babey & Jeremy V. Miles, Exploring the
Differences Between Pet and Non-Pet Owners: Implications for Human-Animal Interaction
Research and Policy, PLOS ONE 11-12 (June 23, 2017).
315. Id. at 2-3. The papers we discuss below generally control for the key demographic
differences.
316. Carl M. Harper, Yan Dong, Thomas S. Thornhill, John Wright, John Ready, Gregory
W. Brick & George Dyer, Can Therapy Dogs Improve Pain and Satisfaction After Total Joint
Arthroplasty? A Randomized Controlled Trial, 473 CLINICAL ORTHOPEDICS & RELATED RSCH.
372, 374-75 (2015). Most of the participants in the study were senior citizens, which isn’t
surprising given that all participants had arthritis. Id. at 376 tbl.1.
317. The mean age for the respondents was sixty-seven for the treatment group and sixtysix for the control group. Id. at 376-77 & tbl.1.
318. Caterina Ambrosi, Charles Zaiontz, Giuseppe Peragine, Simona Sarchi & Francesca
Bona, Randomized Controlled Study on the Effectiveness of Animal-Assisted Therapy on
Depression, Anxiety, and Illness Perception in Institutionalized Elderly, 19 PSYCHOGERIATRICS
55, 58 (2019).
319. Id. at 63.
320. Id.
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though the latter findings are confounded by the presence of dog
handlers who were present during the sessions and also interacted
with the patients.321
The most authoritative and meaningful assessment of the effects
of pet ownership comes from the American Heart Association
(AHA), which concluded, following an extensive literature review,
that “[p]et ownership, particularly dog ownership, is probably associated with decreased CVD [cardiovascular disease] risk [and]
may have some causal role in reducing CVD risk.”322 Accordingly,
the AHA included pet ownership, and dog ownership in particular,
as a reasonable strategy to reduce the risk of cardiovascular
disease.323 While hedged, this recommendation is significant, as it
pertains to the leading cause of death in America.324
Observational studies generally buttress the AHA’s recommendation, with some showing reductions in cardiovascular mortality of
26 percent among pet owners compared to those who had never
owned companion animals.325 Another twelve-year longitudinal
observation study, conducted in a large population of Swedish
adults, also found that dog ownership was associated with significant reductions in cardiovascular mortality.326 The authors hypothesized that the relationship may be causal because having
companion animals alleviates “psychosocial stress factors, such as
social isolation, depression and loneliness” and also lowers activity
in the sympathetic nervous system while improving stress management.327 Interestingly, the cardiovascular health benefits of having
companion animals do not seem to result from pet owners lowering
their BMIs through dog walking and other pet-related activities.328
321. Ambrosi’s study was substantially underpowered, with a sample size of thirty-one
patients, so it would be helpful to try the same interventions on a larger group of patients. Id.
at 57.
322. Levine et al., supra note 309, at 2356.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 2353.
325. Enayet K. Chowdhury, Mark R. Nelson, Garry L.R. Jennings, Lindon M.H. Wing &
Christopher M. Reid, Pet Ownership and Survival in the Elderly Hypertensive Population, 35
J. HYPERTENSION 769, 772 (2017).
326. Mwenya Mubanga, Liisa Byberg, Christoph Nowak, Agneta Egenvall, Patrik K.
Magnusson, Erik Ingelsson & Tove Fall, Dog Ownership and the Risk of Cardiovascular
Disease and Death—A Nationwide Cohort Study, 7 SCI. REPS., Nov. 17, 2017, at 3.
327. Id. at 5.
328. Kenta Miyake, Kumiko Kito, Ayaka Kotemori, Kazuto Sasaki, Junpei Yamamoto,
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Meta-analyses reveal no significant association between pet ownership and obesity.329
Regarding other diseases, the evidence for therapeutic benefits is
much weaker. For example, an observational study of more than
123,000 postmenopausal participants in the Women’s Health Initiative found no association between pet ownership and the incidence of cancer.330 A good deal of evidence suggests a positive
association between pet ownership and older individuals’ emotional
well-being,331 though again, selection bias confounds some of the
analysis. From a health perspective, the primary downside of pet
ownership appears to be limited to the potential for dogs to cause
older people to fall and injure themselves.332 So companion animals
are not a panacea, but reasonably strong evidence suggests that
dogs in particular produce real health benefits for elderly homeowners.333
The costs to older people of being unable to live with companionship animals were thrown into especially sharp relief as a result of
the COVID-19 pandemic, when, for safety reasons, many elderly
individuals, who were at high risk of mortality if they contracted the
disease, had to isolate themselves from friends and family.334 For
Yuko Otagiri, Miho Nagasawa, Sayaka Kuze-Arata, Kazutaka Mogi, Takefumi Kikusui &
Junko Ishihara, Association Between Pet Ownership and Obesity: A Systematic Review and
Meta-Analysis, 17 INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH 3498, 3511-12 (2020).
329. Id. at 3512.
330. David O. Garcia, Eric M. Lander, Betsy C. Wertheim, JoAnn E. Manson, Stella L.
Volpe, Rowan T. Chlebowski, Marcia L. Stefanick, Lawrence S. Lessin, Lewis H. Kuller &
Cynthia A. Thomson, Pet Ownership and Cancer Risk in the Women’s Health Initiative, 25
CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY, BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 1311, 1311-12, 1315 (2016).
331. See Branson et al., supra note 310, at 40; Huss, supra note 312, at 504-05
(summarizing research); Deborah Miller, Sara Staats & Christie Partlo, Discriminating
Positive and Negative Aspects of Pet Interaction: Sex Differences in the Older Population, 27
SOC. INDICATORS RSCH. 363, 372 (1992); Pat Sable, Pets, Attachment, and Well-Being Across
the Life Cycle, 40 SOC. WORK 334, 337 (1995). But see Herzog, supra note 313, at 238.
332. Pets cause approximately eighty-seven thousand nonfatal injuries to humans resulting
in ER visits every year, with approximately 88 percent of these injuries resulting from dogs.
The most common such injuries are fractures, which occur approximately twenty-six thousand
times per year in the United States. Centers for Disease Control, Nonfatal Fall-Related
Injuries Associated with Dogs and Cats—United States, 2001-2006, 58 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 277, 279 tbl.1 (2009). Cats and dogs were thus associated with
approximately 1 percent of the fall injuries that resulted in patients’ visits to emergency
rooms nationwide. Id. at 281.
333. See, e.g., Levine et al., supra note 309, at 2356.
334. Mary E. Rauktis & Janet Hoy-Gerlach, Animal (Non-Human) Companionship for
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many older people living alone during the pandemic, their companion animals became an even more significant source of emotional
support and fulfilling interactions than usual.335 One survey asked
825 elderly Americans what brought them happiness during the
pandemic and found that contact with their companion animals was
the fourth most frequently mentioned source of joy during the pandemic, behind time spent with families and friends in person, digital
social contact, and engagement with hobbies.336 Pets ranked above
time spent with partners or spouses, religious faith, and time spent
enjoying nature.337 For seniors in their sixties, companion animals
ranked as the second largest source of joy, and they were the third
most significant source of joy for female seniors across cohorts.338 On
the other hand, the same study also found that people for whom
companion animals provided a significant source of joy reported
more stress than those who did not mention companion animals,
though the authors noted that it was difficult to establish a causal
connection.339 And another paper reported that for a minority of
older respondents (roughly 10 percent), concerns about how to care
for a pet in the event of their hospitalization may have contributed
to delays in seeking testing or treatment for COVID-19.340 In short,
there are some reasons at the margins to think that pet ownership
among elderly people has been a largely, but not uniformly, positive
development during the recent pandemic.341
While millions of Americans of all ages love their companion
animals, the weight of the evidence suggests that prohibitions on
Adults Aging in Place During COVID-19: A Critical Support, a Source of Concern and
Potential for Social Work Responses, 63 J. GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 702, 702 (2020).
335. Jessica Lee Oliva & Kim Louise Johnston, Puppy Love in the Time of Corona: Dog
Ownership Protects Against Loneliness for Those Living Alone During the COVID-19
Lockdown, 67 INT’L J. SOC. PSYCHIATRY 232, 240 (2021); Rauktis & Hoy-Gerlach, supra note
334, at 704.
336. Brenda R. Whitehead & Emily Torossian, Older Adults’ Experience of the COVID-19
Pandemic: A Mixed-Methods Analysis of Stresses and Joys, 61 GERONTOLOGIST 36, 41, 43
(2021).
337. Id. at 43.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 41.
340. Jennifer W. Applebaum, Britni L. Adams, Michelle N. Eliasson, Barbara A. Zsembik
& Shelby E. McDonald, How Pets Factor into Healthcare Decisions for COVID-19: A One
Health Perspective, 11 ONE HEALTH, Dec. 20, 2020, at 3.
341. See Rauktis & Hoy-Gerlach, supra note 334, at 704; Applebaum et al., supra note 340,
at 3.
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companion animals in homeowners’ associations impose disproportionate burdens on elderly residents.342 Even setting aside jurisdictions such as California that by statute override common interest
communities’ prohibitions on cats, dogs, and other common companion animals, some older residents who wish to challenge a pet
restriction have other options.343 An important tool in the arsenal of
many homeowners is the FHA, which prohibits discrimination in
housing on the basis of a disability.344 For example, in Bhogaita v.
Altamonte Heights Condominium Ass’n, the Eleventh Circuit invalidated a condominium association’s twenty-five-pound pet weight
policy because it precluded the plaintiff, a veteran who suffered
from posttraumatic stress disorder, from residing with his emotional
support dog.345 Bhogaita’s dog, Kane, exceeded the building’s weight
limit from the time he was purchased.346 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a jury verdict that Bhogaita was disabled and that permitting him to live with Kane was a reasonable accommodation
required by the FHA.347 Other courts have reached similar results.348
Depending on the definition used, estimates for the percentage of
older Americans who are disabled range from approximately 20
percent to a little more than 50 percent,349 so a non-trivial number
of older members of homeowners’ associations could plausibly
overcome their associations’ pet prohibitions by using a legitimate
service animal to aid their physical or mental health. But what
about nondisabled elderly people, or disabled seniors who do not
have a plausible claim that a service animal would constitute a
reasonable accommodation? Recall our argument in Part III that
342. See Cookman, supra note 29, at 229-30.
343. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
344. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)-(2).
345. 765 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 2014).
346. Id.
347. Id. at 1288-89.
348. See, e.g., Revock v. Cowpet Bay W. Condo. Ass’n, 853 F.3d 96, 110 (3d Cir. 2017); Sabal
Palm Condos. of Pine Island Ridge Ass’n v. Fischer, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1283 (S.D. Fla. 2014);
Sanzaro v. Ardiente Homeowners Ass’n, LLC, 364 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1163 (D. Nev. 2019). For
an astute discussion of the dynamics of legitimate and illegitimate use of service animals, see
Doron Dorfman, Suspicious Species, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. 1363.
349. See Brenda C. Spillman, Changes in Elderly Disability Rates and the Implications for
Health Care Utilization and Cost, 82 MILBANK Q. 157, 163 (2004); Liming Cai & James Lubitz,
Was There Compression of Disability for Older Americans from 1992 to 2003?, 44 DEMOGRAPHY 479, 485 tbl.1 (2007).
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the law should consider expanding its protections to include seniors
who are prone to becoming disabled if the law fails to intervene.350
Reducing the risk and severity of chronic heart disease would prevent numerous disabilities, not to mention premature deaths.351 So
if companion animals could contribute to that effort, the societal
benefits would be substantial.
A key question here is whether legal intervention is warranted by
the apparent costs of pet restrictions for older people. There are significant downsides to having the courts second guess the countless
decisions that are made in homeowners’ associations every year, and
even narrowing the domain of review to pet prohibitions would
involve the courts in a number of disputes that judges might prefer
to avoid.352 A pertinent consideration is whether normal democracy
is working as it should in homeowners’ associations.353 Are there
reasons to believe that the process of imposing rules on a newly created association or enacting rules in an existing association via the
democratic process facilitates tyrannies of the majority, agency
problems, or rent seeking? A broader literature addresses this question, with a range of responses from interventionist approaches to
laissez-faire and to various embraces of moderation.354 Our aim here
is not to join that larger debate but to focus specifically on the
implications for pet restrictions and elderly pet owners.
On that score, an important point to consider is that homeowners’
associations with a higher percentage of older residents appear less
likely to experience high levels of violations that result in enforcement actions by the association.355 The scholars who produced this
study interpret the enforcement intensity survey data they collected
to mean that elderly residents are more likely to follow the rules,356
350. See supra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
351. See Heart Disease Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.cdc.
gov/heartdisease/facts.htm [https://perma.cc/X8JN-GCTS].
352. See Michael C. Pollack, Judicial Deference and Institutional Character: Homeowners
Associations and the Puzzle of Private Governance, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 839, 880 (2013).
353. Id. at 862.
354. See id. at 844-45; Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential
Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1989); Stewart E. Sterk, Minority
Protection in Residential Private Governments, 77 B.U. L. REV. 273 (1997); Richard A. Epstein,
Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906 (1988).
355. Jay Weiser & Ronald Neath, Private Ordering, Social Cohesion and Value: Residential
Community Association Covenant Enforcement, 19 INT’L REAL EST. REV. 1, 17 (2016).
356. Id.
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which is plausible, but that is not the only sensible causal inference.
For example, if older people are routinely overrepresented in
homeowners’ associations’ decision-making bodies, then it may be
that HOAs are less likely to enact rules that elderly residents will
violate or more likely to exercise enforcement discretion in a way
that benefits other elderly residents. To our dismay, despite extensive searching, we were unable to locate a single reputable source
that studies the demographics of homeowners’ associations’ boards.
There is nothing reliable published on the important topic. So while
there are popular stereotypes about retirees being overrepresented
on these boards, only anecdotes support this possibility.357
There is an important related question about which the social
science data sheds a bit more light. Anti-pet restrictions cause
condominiums to sell for less than they would with more permissive
policies, according to the only good recent empirical analysis of the
issue, which drew on MLS data from Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
earlier this decade.358 Common-interest communities that restrict
companion animals therefore may be leaving money on the table
when they do so.359 The question is why. One possibility is that
homeowners’ associations and their management companies are ignorant about the data or have some reason to doubt the external
validity of a study completed in Florida.360 Another is that associations recognize the financial hits their residents are taking by prohibiting companion animals but value the exclusion of companion

357. As noted above, evidence suggests that elderly citizens are much more politically
potent at the state government level than at the local level, at least where land use law is
concerned. See Brinig & Garnett, supra note 32, at 539.
358. Zhenguo Lin, Marcus T. Allen & Charles C. Carter, Pet Policy and Housing Prices:
Evidence from the Condominium Market, 47 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 109, 114, 121 (2013).
359. Id. at 121.
360. From a market perspective, the right number of communities with pet restrictions is
plausibly not zero. That is, if a large number of communities that presently prohibit pets
started allowing them, prices in those communities would drop, and prices in communities
that barred them would rise. So the Florida data tells us that in the Fort Lauderdale market
there was extra demand for condominiums with more permissive policies. See id. The equilibrium might be different in other markets or at other moments in time, which is why it is
surprising that there has only been one serious look at the question in recent years. More
studies of the same question will help scholars evaluate the external validity of the Fort
Lauderdale finding.
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animals more than they value the higher resale premiums that
more relaxed rules would probably facilitate.361
Considering this mixed body of evidence, our tentative conclusion
is that the externalities associated with older Americans’ relationships with their companion animals warrant greater judicial
scrutiny of pet restrictions in common interest communities than
the deferential Nahrstedt standard suggests. The evidence is not
voluminous, rigorous, or consistent enough to render a pet restriction unreasonable on its face. But the weight of that evidence and
the relatively restricted opportunities for exit by older people
suggest that, particularly for those older owners, permitting
plaintiffs to challenge these restrictions as unreasonable as applied
to them is warranted.362 In short, Justice Arabian had it right.363
Whereas Nahrstedt required the plaintiff to show that no reasonable
common interest community could ban any cat, a more appropriate
test would have permitted her to prevail upon a showing that it was
unreasonable for the association to ban her (strictly indoor) cats,
given the associated costs and benefits.364 A showing that the
prohibition on pet ownership imposes harms on the individual that
substantially outweigh the associated community benefits of enforcing the prohibition ought to be adequate for the pet owner to
obtain relief. In cases in which the presence of companion animals
imposed real harms on the neighbors, such as severe allergies, a
restriction would be upheld.365 This is a hard standard for a pet
361. The considerations in the rental housing market are somewhat different because
landlords may fear that pets impose greater wear and tear on units. In a condominium, the
unit owner internalizes those costs. Nonetheless, the argument we make here could sensibly
be extended to pet restrictions in rental buildings, provided landlords were able to charge the
elderly tenants security deposits that reflected the associated costs of repairing pet-related
damage. See, e.g., Danielle Mason, The Best Landlord Pet Policy, LANDLORD STUDIO (Sept. 12,
2019), https://www.landlordstudio.com/blog/the-best-landlord-pet-policy/ [https://perma.cc/
J7U7-7N49].
362. See Pollack, supra note 352, at 857-60 (arguing that, where exit opportunities are
constrained, less deferential review by courts of HOA decision-making is warranted).
363. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
364. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1289-90 (Cal. 1994) (“In
determining whether a restriction is ‘unreasonable’ under section 1354, and thus not
enforceable, the focus is on the restriction’s effect on the project as a whole, not on the
individual homeowner.”).
365. See, e.g., Cohen v. Clark, 945 N.W.2d 792, 807 (Iowa 2020) (finding that permitting
a service animal for one tenant in a previously no-pets building, which caused severe allergic
reactions for another tenant who had lived in the building previously, was not a reasonable
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owner to meet but, unlike current law, is not a nearly impossible
one.
Of course, for many lawyers and law students who encounter
Nahrstedt for the first time, the fact that the pet restrictions were
in place at the time Ms. Nahrstedt moved into Lakeside Village is
a showstopper.366 She consented to abide by the community’s rules
and should not complain about the application of restrictions about
which she was provided notice.367 These ideas have real force as applied to middle-aged residents like Nahrstedt or people who consented to live under a set of rules and then challenged them shortly
thereafter.368 But these arguments have less force when pressed
against long-time residents who face higher relocation costs, income
inelasticity, and are especially well-suited to high-density housing
that minimizes staircases and maximizes senior-friendly amenities
like doormen or indoor spaces for recreation.369 As we have emphasized throughout this Article, moving is generally harder on older
people, and their needs may change over the life cycle in ways that
are easier for a condominium board or real estate developer to
anticipate than they would be for the home purchaser herself.370
Consider again the case of the elderly condominium dweller who is
cut off from all her friends and family for a year or longer because
of the need to take safety precautions during a pandemic. A kitten
or puppy may provide her with the best face-to-face companionship
and affection she can get during a time of crisis. At a time when
moving is dangerous, should she really have no recourse to challenge a rigid set of restrictions that produces only abstract benefits?
Forcing the owner of a pet that causes no negative externalities
to change residences if she wishes to live with the companion animal is a large ask in the absence of any clear rationale other than
“a deal is a deal.” To the extent that isolating older people without
companion animals imposes greater medical costs on society, and
greater burdens on an older individual’s relatives to fill a companionship void, it is hard to see why the owner of a well-behaved,
accommodation required by Iowa’s state equivalent of the Fair Housing Act).
366. See Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1278.
367. See id.
368. See id.
369. See Housing for Seniors: Challenges and Solutions, supra note 246.
370. See supra notes 16-40 and accompanying text.
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conventional pet ought not to have an opportunity to show that a
restriction is unenforceable against her. Such a rule would then
permit associations to focus their enforcement resources on those
companion animals that genuinely interfere with the neighbors’
enjoyment of their lives.371
V. AGE-RESTRICTED COMMUNITIES
Sometimes the elderly do exit their existing communities, and as
the population of senior citizens has swelled, age-restricted
communities have become some of the fastest growing cities and
towns in the United States and around the world.372 This has not
escaped notice from legal scholars, though with a peculiar emphasis,
especially where antidiscrimination law is concerned.373 More
precisely, there is a large body of legal scholarship that examines
the exception to fair housing laws that Congress granted to agerestricted communities.374 This exception under the federal FHA
permits communities in which at least 80 percent of households
include someone fifty-five or older to discriminate on the basis of
family status.375 As a practical matter this means that such communities can prevent families with young children from residing
there.376 Congress initially made this exception to family status
discrimination contingent on these communities offering special
services or facilities to suit the needs of an older population, but
those requirements were watered down in subsequent legislation at
the behest of real estate developers, seniors’ organizations, and
related interest groups.377

371. See, e.g., Cohen v. Clark, 945 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 2020).
372. Robert Osei-Kyei, Ibrahim Y. Wuni, Bo Xia & Trinh Tri Minh, Research Trend on
Retirement Village Development for the Elderly: A Scientometric Analysis, 34 J. AGING & ENV’T
402, 414 (2020).
373. See Mark D. Bauer, “Peter Pan” as Public Policy: Should Fifty-Five-Plus Age-Restricted
Communities Continue to Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws and Substantive Federal
Regulation? 21 ELDER L.J. 33, 35 (2013).
374. See, e.g., id.
375. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2).
376. Bauer, supra note 373, at 38-39.
377. Id. at 39-41; Nicole Napolitano, Note, The Fair Housing Act Amendments and Age
Restrictive Covenants in Condominiums and Cooperatives, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 273, 286-87
(1999).
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Given the importance for older people of place, kinship, and the
support, familiarity, and social and mental stimulation these represent for seniors,378 there is a natural logic to creating and sustaining these communities. In the passage of time, it is quite possible that someone who has lived in an age-integrated community
for decades sees his friends and neighbors move away or die, his
children relocate, and other social networks break down.379 The pace
of gentrification and development, aided at times by the sorts of
eminent-domain-driven involuntary relocations discussed above,380
or the need to exit a life tenancy that is impractical because of rigidity in waste law,381 only contributes to the potential erosion of
these ties. Some older people may also move to communities that
offer lower tax burdens, packages of collective amenities that are attractive to aging populations, or more favorable weather.382 In all of
these ways, age-restricted communities are one way to replicate the
supports and personal society that some older people see taken from
them or, at least, jeopardized by the dynamics explored throughout
this Article.383
At the same time, concerns linger. The history of family status
discrimination is interesting and important in its own right, but the
most troubling aspect of these communities from an FHA perspective is hiding in plain sight, and it involves race rather than family
status.
We can dive into the census data to get a sense of the demographics of age-restricted communities. A lot of similarities play out. We
will use the five largest age-restricted communities in the United
States and the most recent available census data as our data set.

378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.

See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
Seeman, supra note 38, at 367-68.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part II.
Bauer, supra note 373, at 34.
See Smith & Cartlidge, supra note 29, at 552.
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Table 1. Resident Demographics in the Nation’s Largest AgeRestricted Communities 384
The
Villages,
FL

Sun City,
AZ

Sun City
West, AZ

Laguna
Woods,
CA

Green
Valley,
AZ

2020
Population

79,077

39,931

25,806

17,644

22,616

% 65+
% White
% Black
% Asian
% Multiracial
% Hispanic
% White NonHispanic
Median home
value ($)
% High school
grads
% College
grads
% Disabled
% In civilian
labor force
Median
household
income ($)

81.6
98.0
0.4
0.9
0.5
1.2
96.9

75.8
94.9
2.6
1.0
0.3
4.2
92.4

84.1
97.5
0.9
0.6
0.7
1.2
96.6

82.8
76.3
0.7
19.7
1.4
5.8
72.0

79.8
98.3
0.2
0.5
0.6
5.0
93.6

280,300

159,900

221,500

288,400

175,400

97.3

93.3

95.3

94.7

95.7

42.3

23.6

33.7

49.3

42.1

9.3
13.1

23.8
18.8

17.8
12.6

14.2
19.9

15.1
15.4

63,841

40,586

52,196

44,020

49,147

With respect to the demographics, the communities seem quite
similar, with Laguna Woods’s large Asian American population
making it something of an outlier.385 Sun City’s nearly 3 percent
Black population also makes it an outlier, with all of the other
384. We created this table using data taken from U.S. Census Bureau Quick Facts. See
Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/greenvalleycdp
arizona,lagunawoodscitycalifornia,suncitywestcdparizona,suncitycdparizona,thevillagescd
pflorida,US/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/CUE5-UGSB].
385. See id.
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communities having a Black population that is below 1 percent.386
In each community, more than 80 percent of residents are not part
of the civilian labor force.387 The Villages stands out for its relatively
high median income; it and Laguna Woods have substantially higher home prices than the other three communities.388
Among senior citizens nationwide in 2016, 9 percent were Black,
4 percent were Asian American, and another 8 percent were Hispanic.389 Black seniors are thus roughly three to forty-five times as
numerous in the nation as a whole as they are in the largest agerestricted communities.390 There is a substantial racial and income
gap among seniors, but this gap is inadequate to explain the substantial underrepresentation of minority residents in these communities, as the moderate income levels and generally affordable
nature of the housing in these communities suggests.391 Other than
a book chapter focused on The Villages that one of us wrote a few
years ago,392 and another article by Kevin McHugh and Elizabeth
Larson-Keagy that examined the demographics of Arizona’s Sun
City communities,393 the racially homogenous nature of age-restricted communities has gone unmentioned in the literature. The most
any other scholars have mustered was a single sentence in an article by Robert Schwemm and Michael Allen indicating that there
was no reason to believe that senior citizen housing developments
are not as prone as other parts of the U.S. housing sector to racial
segregation.394 The data presented in Table 1 suggests that senior

386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. 2017 Profile on Older Americans, ADMIN. FOR CMTY. LIVING (Apr. 2018),
https://acl.gov/sites/default/files/Aging%20and%20Disability%20in%20America/2017Older
AmericansProfile.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC8P-9S2T].
390. See id.; Quick Facts, supra note 384.
391. See Quick Facts, supra note 384.
392. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Historic Preservation and Its Even Less Authentic Alternative,
in EVIDENCE AND INNOVATION IN HOUSING LAW AND POLICY 108-09 (Lee Anne Fennell &
Benjamin J. Keys eds., 2017).
393. Kevin E. McHugh & Elizabeth M. Larson-Keagy, These White Walls: The Dialectic of
Retirement Communities, 19 J. AGING STUD. 241, 245 (2005).
394. Robert G. Schwemm & Michael Allen, For the Rest of Their Lives: Seniors and the Fair
Housing Act, 90 IOWA L. REV. 121, 177-78 (2004).
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citizen housing is actually where the country’s racial segregation
problems are most pronounced.395
Of course, under the FHA, the fact that a community is racially
homogenous is not itself adequate to demonstrate that the developer, landlord, or homeowners’ association has engaged in unlawful
conduct.396 And the question of how, precisely, these age-restricted
communities came to be so monochromatic is unresolved. The Villages evidently achieved an extraordinary level of residential racial
segregation through a combination of exclusionary amenity and
exclusionary vibe strategies, though it would not be surprising if
common practices like unlawful steering of Black home seekers by
real estate agents also played a role.397 In any event, at least in The
Villages, the results are a built environment and a social environment likely to repel most Black homebuyers. An existing community
of residents who find the prospect of a nearly all-white community
to be a feature rather than a bug is likely to maintain that segregation from one generation of residents to the next.398 Once hypersegregated communities get going, they can create a kind of momentum that would convince large numbers of minority residents that
they would be unwelcome if they elected to move there.399 Unfortunately, we are not aware of any systematic investigation into the
behaviors of age-restricted communities that foster extreme racial
segregation, so it is presently impossible to say whether unlawful
practices have contributed significantly to these troubling demographics.
But even if—indeed, especially if—these demographics are the
result of entirely lawful behavior, it is important to evaluate
whether and to what extent they ought to trouble us. That is, given
the benefits they afford to older people already systematically
underserved by numerous other areas of property law, do these
patterns of racial segregation undermine the case for the special
treatment of age-restricted communities? On that score, we offer
395. See Quick Facts, supra note 384.
396. A plaintiff suing under the FHA must show either disparate treatment with respect
to a protected characteristic, or a disparate impact causally linked to “artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary” policies. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2522-23 (2015).
397. Strahilevitz, supra note 392, at 113.
398. See id.
399. See id.
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three preliminary thoughts about why breaking down other patterns and practices of residential segregation perhaps ought to be a
higher priority than addressing those patterns in age-restricted
communities—along with several important countervailing considerations that make our normative conclusions in this Part relatively
more cautious than the others we offered above.
One major argument for policies that promote residential racial
integration depends on the contact hypothesis. The contact hypothesis is the idea that when people spend more time with people from
an outgroup, this exposure lessens prejudiced feelings.400 The notion
has a long pedigree, originating in Gordon Allport’s 1954 book, The
Nature of Prejudice.401 In the decades since, the question of whether
familiarity with members of a different racial or ethnic group
diminished bias toward members of that group has been explored in
hundreds of papers. Given the size of the literature, meta-analyses
are particularly helpful, and there have been two ambitious metaanalyses in the last fifteen years. The first, by Thomas Pettigrew
and Linda Tropp in 2006, found overwhelming evidence to support
the contact hypothesis, with more contact with outgroup members
causing people to feel more positive not only about the individuals
they met but also about the groups to which those individuals belong.402 The second, published in 2019 by Elizabeth Paluck, Seth
Green, and Donald Green, provided a more qualified endorsement,
concluding that:
the overwhelming majority of studies report positive effects,
and a random-effects model suggests that the true underlying
effect is substantively quite large. On the other hand, the collection of studies has ... important limitations. First is the gap
in coverage. We know little about the effects of contact on adults
over 25 years of age. In particular, the meta-analysis furnishes
no evidence about contact’s effects on adults’ racial or ethnic
prejudices, which was the original policy-based motivation for
this body of work.403
400. See GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 261 (1979).
401. Id. at 261-81.
402. Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact
Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 751, 766 (2006).
403. Elizabeth Levy Paluck, Seth A. Green & Donald P. Green, The Contact Hypothesis ReEvaluated, 3 BEHAV. PUB. POL’Y 129, 149-50 (2019).
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Along similar lines, Pettigrew and Tropp’s earlier review found
that the evidence points towards college students being significantly
more likely than adults generally to reconsider existing prejudice
through contact with members of diverse communities.404 In short,
these two comprehensive meta-analyses point to a critical question
left open despite decades of research—whether the contact hypothesis holds for older people, whose racial prejudices may be relatively
ossified.405
A key argument for legal interventions that will integrate the
housing market is that familiarity breeds empathy. If Black Americans do not live among white Americans, then the two groups may
harbor views about each other that are unduly shaped by the most
problematic stereotypes. And the evidence supporting the contact
hypothesis suggests that positive interactions with members of
different racial groups can indeed overcome preexisting prejudice.406
But that evidence is largely limited to children, teenagers, and
people in their twenties.407 There is scant evidence that once people
reach adulthood, and particularly once they reach the more advanced ages that permit residence in age-restricted communities,
increased contact with members of an outgroup has the capacity to
change hearts and minds.
A related benefit of residential integration is that public schools
are typically zoned based on the neighborhood, so municipalities
that are more residentially integrated will tend to find their schools
more integrated as well.408 School desegregation is critically
404. Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 402, at 764.
405. People generally become less open to new experiences as they age, see Nikolas
Westerhoff, Set in Our Ways, SCI. AM. MIND, Dec. 2008, at 44, 46, and political attitudes are
generally quite stable over the life cycle. See Johnathon C. Peterson, Kevin B. Smith & John
R. Hibbing, Do People Really Become More Conservative as They Age?, 82 J. POL. 600, 607-08
(2020). The evidence that elderly people are more broadly set in their ways than middle-aged
people is scant, see, e.g., Nicholas L. Danigelis, Melissa Hardy & Stephen J. Cutler, Population Aging, Intracohort Aging, and Sociopolitical Attitudes, 72 AM. SOCIO. REV. 812, 823
(2007), though both elderly and middle-aged people appear to have more stable attitudes than
adolescents and young adults; see Elias Dinas, Opening “Openness to Change”: Political Events
and the Increased Sensitivity of Young Adults, 66 POL. RSCH. Q. 868, 876 (2013); Jon A.
Krosnick & Duane F. Alwin, Aging and Susceptibility to Attitude Change, 57 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCH. 416, 421 (1989).
406. E.g., ALLPORT, supra note 400, at 261-81.
407. See id.
408. Cf. Kate Taylor, Manhattan School in Zoning Battle Is Struggling, but It Has Fans,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/nyregion/public-school-191-

638

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:561

important for children of all races for a number of reasons. One is
the contact hypothesis referenced above, which suggests that when
students attend racially integrated schools they will have more
positive attitudes towards groups to which they do not belong.
Another is that students who attend diverse schools will learn more
and better understand the experiences of people who belong to
different racial groups, which may help them develop skills that are
important to thrive in a diverse world and economy.409 A further
benefit of integration is that when public schools are racially segregated, schools attended overwhelmingly by Black students are
starved for resources, and student achievement suffers.410 All that
said, the case for racially integrating age-restricted communities is
substantially diminished because children are scarce or even entirely absent in these communities.411 In short, the hyper-segregated
nature of age-restricted communities does not meaningfully contribute to the segregation of schools because there are virtually no
school-aged children living in these communities.
Another terrible consequence of residential segregation is that it
reinforces existing inequalities in the labor market. Word-of-mouth
networks are vital in helping people find jobs.412 Such tips from
friends or relatives seem to explain how roughly half of all workers
landed in their current jobs.413 As one might expect, there are significant racial disparities at play, and there is reason to believe that
these social networks work more effectively for white Americans
than for Black Americans, though informal networks loom large
manhattan-rezoning-upper-west-side.html [https://perma.cc/X656-8L3G].
409. Jennifer Jellison Holme, Amy Stuart Wells & Anita Tijerina Revilla, Learning
Through Experience: What Graduates Gained by Attending Desegregated High Schools, 38
EQUITY & EXCELLENCE EDUC. 14, 18-19 (2005).
410. See, e.g., Jonathan Guryan, Desegregation and Black Dropout Rates, 94 AM. ECON.
REV. 919, 939-40 (2004); Sarah J. Reber, School Desegregation and Educational Attainment
for Blacks, 45 J. HUM. RES. 893, 912-13 (2010).
411. For example, the city of Laguna Woods has no public schools, so it uses municipal
revenue that otherwise would have gone toward schools to build golf cart trails. Ross Andel
& Phoebe S. Liebig, The City of Laguna Woods: A Case of Senior Power in Local Politics, 24
RSCH. ON AGING 87, 100 (2002). As it happens, the city approved the expenditure of resources
on dog parks after “cit[ing] psychosocial benefits for seniors of owning and interacting with
a pet.” Id.
412. The canonical source is MARK GRANOVETTER, GETTING A JOB: A STUDY OF CONTACTS
AND CAREERS (2d ed. 1995).
413. Yannis M. Ioannides & Linda Datcher Loury, Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects, and Inequality, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1056, 1058 (2004).
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regardless of race.414 By some credible estimates, differences in
word-of-mouth networks account for approximately one-fifth of the
divergence in employment status between Black and white young
men.415 These problems do not seem prominent at firms where the
workforce is racially diverse,416 but if a firm is itself racially
homogenous then it is likely that members of racial groups that are
underrepresented will not be referred to jobs at the firm through
informal networks.
The empirical research on job searches points to the presence of
significant neighborhood effects—in some communities information
about economic opportunities is plentiful, whereas in others the information environment is comparatively impoverished.417 These
problems are especially pronounced in neighborhoods characterized
by high levels of poverty among Black Americans.418 In these neighborhoods, high-quality job opportunities are few and far between,
and residents are less willing to help their contacts with informal
job searches.419 The segregation of people of color into particular
neighborhoods, particularly high-poverty neighborhoods, seems to
contribute substantially to pervasive racial income inequality in
the United States.
Once again, though, the problems that result from racial segregation and the resulting segregation of informal social networks is
a much larger problem for working-age Americans than it is for
Americans in their late sixties, seventies, and eighties. In agerestricted communities, less than 20 percent of the population typically works.420 Presumably most of these residents have exited the
labor market voluntarily and do not plan to return. Thus, the racial
segregation of neighborhoods plays a far larger role in cementing
the racial income gap for Americans in their twenties and thirties
414. See David A. Reingold, Social Networks and the Employment Problem of the Urban
Poor, 36 URB. STUD. 1907, 1925 (1999).
415. Ioannides & Loury, supra note 413, at 1059.
416. See, e.g., Roberto M. Fernandez & Isabel Fernandez-Mateo, Networks, Race, and
Hiring, 71 AM. SOCIO. REV. 42, 58 (2006).
417. Ioannides & Loury, supra note 413, at 1071-72.
418. Lindsay Hamm & Steve McDonald, Helping Hands: Race, Neighborhood Context, and
Reluctance in Providing Job-Finding Assistance, 56 SOCIO. Q. 539, 552 (2015).
419. See id.; see also Alexandra M. Curley, Draining or Gaining? The Social Networks of
Public Housing Movers in Boston, 26 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 227, 240-41 (2009).
420. Quick Facts, supra note 384.
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than it does for those in their sixties and seventies. Just like the rise
of hyper-segregated, age-restricted communities does little to
prompt public school segregation, it seems to be a trivial contributor
to the racial inequality in economic opportunities. By the time
Americans of any race are moving into an age-restricted community,
the die has unfortunately been cast.421
Health disparities are another relevant consideration. To the
extent that racial segregation resulted in white seniors receiving
higher quality medical care than Black seniors, that dynamic would
justify aggressive interventions to desegregate age-restricted communities. While Black and white Americans do largely receive their
care at different kinds of hospitals, the evidence about significant
racial disparities in the quality of medical care that elderly Black
and white Americans receive at these institutions is inconclusive.422
In terms of changing racial attitudes, promoting school integration, reducing the racial gap in income, and ensuring equal
quality of medical care, then, the benefits of achieving more racially integrated age-restricted communities would seem to be modest.
These are, however, not the only harms that flow from racial segregation, so there remain good reasons not to ignore the racial
homogeneity of age-restricted communities.
One important reason to promote the racial integration of agerestricted communities involves the polarization that can arise in
communities characterized by marked homogeneity. Examining
Sun City, McHugh and Larson-Keagy identified racism as an aspect of life in the community, with residents of retirement communities voting overwhelmingly against designating Martin Luther
King Jr. Day as a state holiday in Arizona in a high-profile 1990 ballot initiative.423 Their account suggests that negative stereotypes
about Black people are commonly embraced in Sun City, and may
result from the scarcity of Black faces in the community.424 This
421. Younger white Americans are generally more willing than older white Americans to
live in neighborhoods with large African American populations. See William A. V. Clark,
Changing Residential Preferences Across Income, Education, and Age, 44 URB. AFFS. REV. 334,
347 (2009).
422. See, e.g., Ashish K. Jha, E. John Orav, Zhonghe Li & Arnold M. Epstein, Concentration
and Quality of Hospitals That Care for Elderly Black Patients, 167 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
1177, 1180-82 (2007) (summarizing the literature and analyzing new data).
423. McHugh & Larson-Keagy, supra note 393, at 247.
424. See id.
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claim is subtly distinct from the contact hypothesis—it is the idea
that physical separateness may make seniors in age- and racesegregated communities feel that they have nothing in common
with outsiders and that they and the state owe these outsiders
nothing.425 If extremely segregated communities become cauldrons
of racial animosity, then members of protected groups who do come
into contact with residents of these communities, either in the service sector or in health care settings, will endure mistreatment.426
A complementary consideration is that the more homogenous the
community demographically, the more extreme the group’s views
become.427 Even having a few more people in the community who
look different or think differently may improve the wisdom of
collective decision-making in these homogenous communities. Seen
from this perspective, the absence of not only young people but also
people of color from age-restricted communities creates a kind of
groupthink that leads communities astray. This has consequences
not only for local political decision-making but also for decisionmaking in states and the nation as well, especially given the high
rates of voter participation among elderly people and their concentration in swing states like Florida and Arizona.428
Indeed, because these age-restricted communities are so homogenous, the law might get a lot of epistemic “bang for its buck” by even
taking modest steps to integrate age-restricted communities. That
said, much rides on the fortitude and patience of community
newcomers to offer perspectives that will be unpopular among their
neighbors. The residents of The Villages tell researchers that they
are very happy when surveyed about their subjective well-being,
and there is some disconcerting evidence to indicate that the
community’s homogeneity might contribute to the high levels of
425. See id.
426. Cf. Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856, 864 (7th Cir. 2018)
(holding that the operator of a senior living community could be liable under the Fair Housing
Act for failing to stem pervasive sexual orientation discrimination against a resident about
which it has been informed).
427. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J.
71, 74-75 (2000).
428. Interestingly, it appears that the political clout of senior citizens in affecting policy is
largely dependent on the cohesion of senior citizens, as opposed to their sheer turnout
numbers in the voting population. See Sarah F. Anzia, When Does a Group of Citizens
Influence Policy? Evidence from Senior Citizen Participation in City Politics, 81 J. POL. 1, 1113 (2019).
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satisfaction that its residents express.429 So while hyper-segregated,
age-restricted communities may be broken in a fundamental sense,
they are broken in a way that, perhaps perversely, seems not to
bother most of their current residents.
Efforts to use the FHA and other civil rights laws to promote the
racial integration of age-restricted communities further several key
priorities. They send signals to members of minority groups that
have suffered de facto exclusion that they are free to live wherever
they like, and this may in turn create salutary signaling messages
for the broader public. These efforts also may help improve the
deliberative process within these communities, potentially fostering
productive engagement in the political arena. On the other hand,
though, several concrete benefits associated with residential racial
integration—promoting school and workplace desegregation and
fostering friendship, civility, and empathy across racial groups—are
dampened in age-restricted communities.430
This state of affairs raises a natural, difficult question about what
the government’s enforcement priorities ought to be. Should tackling this kind of segregation, to the extent that it violates the FHA,
be an enforcement priority for a federal government that is committed to promoting residential racial integration? Of course, if the
government has infinite resources, law enforcement should stamp
out unlawful discrimination wherever it exists. But, sadly, that is
not our world.
Given that the state has finite resources to devote to enforcing
civil rights laws, answering this question of enforcement priorities
may depend in part on what the government is supposed to be doing
when it invokes the FHA. If the government is supposed to be
maximizing social welfare and producing positive spillovers such as
desegregation in public schools and workplaces, then there may be
a weaker case for investigating age-restricted communities, even if
those happen to be the most racially segregated communities in the
United States. Alternatively, if the purpose of the civil rights laws
429. Sarah Fishleder, Lawrence Schonfeld, Jaime Corvin, Susan Tyler & Carla VandeWeerd, Drinking Behavior Among Older Adults in a Planned Retirement Community: Results
from The Villages Survey, 31 INT’L J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 536, 539 (2016); Robert D.
Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 147-48 (2007); Strahilevitz, supra note 392, at 113-14.
430. See supra notes 411, 421 and accompanying text.
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is to communicate to the public about what kind of society America
wants to be, and what our core values are, then an investigation
into what is happening in age-restricted communities will be warranted, even at the expense of investigations in communities that
are heterogeneous with respect to age. This would show that no
community is above the law.
Regardless of whether one thinks the desegregation of agerestricted communities should be a high civil rights enforcement
priority, the persistent racial homogeneity of these communities
indicates that they come with serious costs. That is, even though
they advance meaningful interests for their elderly residents, it is
important to, at a minimum, recognize their racially disparate consequences and consider whether those interests could be achieved
in other ways. In this spirit, our calls for reform in takings, waste,
tenant protection, and condominium law represent steps toward
making ordinary, age-integrated communities better places for older
people to live without contributing to residential segregation in the
way that age-restricted communities do.
CONCLUSION
In contrast to most other areas of the common law, property law
has long taken its subject to be things first, with people entering the
conversation mostly by way of their relationships with things—relationships that are assumed to fit an impersonal, transactional, onesize-fits-all model. But pushing to the sidelines of the law the real,
varied people who own and live on land results in serious oversights
and inequities. Much attention has been rightly paid to the consequences for people of color, Native people, and women. It is time
to consider as well the consequences for older people.
Owing to consistently high relocation costs, systematically inelastic incomes, and uniquely short time horizons, important parts
of property law offer a decidedly poor fit for older Americans. From
takings to waste, and from tenant protection to homeowners’ associations, property law’s fundamental assumptions can be poor fits
for elderly people. And the consequences for their health, safety,
finances, and well-being are often quite significant. There is, however, room in all of these doctrines for a fairer, better-tailored law
to be made. Because virtually everyone in society hopes to reach old
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age one day, providing special protections for older individuals is
politically and legally palatable in ways that extra rights for other
demographic groups may not be. And even if readers disagree with
the normative thrust of our proposals—after all, there are already
other aspects of the law that treat elderly individuals better than
their younger counterparts—they might understand our Article as
a roadmap of where property law might be headed thanks to
demographic changes in society and in the composition of the
electorate.
Many of the problems we tackle in this Article are problems of
excess rigidity that some younger residents also encounter. There
are young people whose lives are measurably improved by their
relationships with companion animals. There are middle-aged
people who are deeply tied to their homes and neighborhoods. There
are tenants with disabilities in their thirties who live on fixed
incomes. And there are life tenants in their fifties who try in vain to
bargain with opportunistic remaindermen. The peculiarities of
aging make the circumstances of older Americans in these same
situations particularly compelling, but some of the more flexible
property doctrines we have proposed here might be justified for
other swaths of the population. For example, people of color have
historically tended to bear the brunt of urban renewal projects
advanced by eminent domain;431 perhaps takings doctrine ought to
take account of racial inequities like that, too. And perhaps
eventually, more flexible property doctrines might be justified for
everyone. Experimenting with legal systems that are a little more
responsive to the needs of our elders might ultimately reveal the
virtues of extending similar breaks to others in our communities or,
indeed, to all of us.

431. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.

